# 1AC

### 1AC---Advantage 1- Food

**Global food crisis is coming**

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World grain reserves are so dangerously low that severe weather in the United States or other food-exporting countries could trigger a major hunger crisis next year, the United Nations has warned. Failing harvests in the US, Ukraine and other countries this year have eroded reserves to their lowest level since 1974. The US, which has experienced record heatwaves and droughts in 2012, now holds in reserve a historically low 6.5% of the maize that it expects to consume in the next year, says the UN. "We've not been producing as much as we are consuming. That is why stocks are being run down. Supplies are now very tight across the world and reserves are at a very low level, leaving no room for unexpected events next year," said Abdolreza Abbassian, a senior economist with the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). With food consumption exceeding the amount grown for six of the past 11 years, countries have run down reserves from an average of 107 days of consumption 10 years ago to under 74 days recently. Prices of main food crops such as wheat and maize are now close to those that sparked riots in 25 countries in 2008. FAO figures released this week suggest that 870 million people are malnourished and the food crisis is growing in the Middle East and Africa. Wheat production this year is expected to be 5.2% below 2011, with yields of most other crops, except rice, also falling, says the UN. The figures come as one of the world's leading environmentalists issued a warning that the global food supply system could collapse at any point, leaving hundreds of millions more people hungry, sparking widespread riots and bringing down governments. In a shocking new assessment of the prospects of meeting food needs, Lester Brown, president of the Earth policy research centre in Washington, says that the climate is no longer reliable and the demands for food are growing so fast that a breakdown is inevitable, unless urgent action is taken. "Food shortages undermined earlier civilisations. We are on the same path. Each country is now fending for itself. The world is living one year to the next," he writes in a new book. According to Brown, we are seeing the start of a food supply breakdown with a dash by speculators to "grab" millions of square miles of cheap farmland, the doubling of international food prices in a decade, and the dramatic rundown of countries' food reserves. This year, for the sixth time in 11 years, the world will consume more food than it produces, largely because of extreme weather in the US and other major food-exporting countries. Oxfam last week said that the price of key staples, including wheat and rice, may double in the next 20 years, threatening disastrous consequences for poor people who spend a large proportion of their income on food. In 2012, according to the FAO, food prices are already at close to record levels, having risen 1.4% in September following an increase of 6% in July. "We are entering a new era of rising food prices and spreading hunger. Food supplies are tightening everywhere and land is becoming the most sought-after commodity as the world shifts from an age of food abundance to one of scarcity," says Brown. "The geopolitics of food is fast overshadowing the geopolitics of oil." His warnings come as the UN and world governments reported that extreme heat and drought in the US and other major food-exporting countries had hit harvests badly and sent prices spiralling. "The situation we are in is not temporary. These things will happen all the time. Climate is in a state of flux and there is no normal any more. "We are beginning a new chapter. We will see food unrest in many more places. "Armed aggression is no longer the principal threat to our future. The overriding threats to this century are climate change, population growth, spreading water shortages and rising food prices," Brown says.

**Causes food nationalism**

Lester R. Brown 11 is the President of the Earth Policy Institute, “The New Geopolitics of Food,” May 2011, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/25/the_new_geopolitics_of_food?page=full>, Accessed Date: 3-15-13 y2k

The potential for conflict -- and not just over water -- is high. Many of the land deals have been made in secret, and in most cases, the land involved was already in use by villagers when it was sold or leased. Often those already farming the land were neither consulted about nor even informed of the new arrangements. And because there typically are no formal land titles in many developing-country villages, the farmers who lost their land have had little backing to bring their cases to court. Reporter John Vidal, writing in Britain's Observer, quotes Nyikaw Ochalla from Ethiopia's Gambella region: "The foreign companies are arriving in large numbers, depriving people of land they have used for centuries. There is no consultation with the indigenous population. The deals are done secretly. The only thing the local people see is people coming with lots of tractors to invade their lands." Local hostility toward such land grabs is the rule, not the exception. In 2007, as food prices were starting to rise, China signed an agreement with the Philippines to lease 2.5 million acres of land slated for food crops that would be shipped home. Once word leaked, the public outcry -- much of it from Filipino farmers -- forced Manila to suspend the agreement. A similar uproar rocked Madagascar, where a South Korean firm, Daewoo Logistics, had pursued rights to more than 3 million acres of land. Word of the deal helped stoke a political furor that toppled the government and forced cancellation of the agreement. Indeed, few things are more likely to fuel insurgencies than taking land from people. Agricultural equipment is easily sabotaged. If ripe fields of grain are torched, they burn quickly. Not only are these deals risky, but foreign investors producing food in a country full of hungry people face another political question of how to get the grain out. Will villagers permit trucks laden with grain headed for port cities to proceed when they themselves may be on the verge of starvation? The potential for political instability in countries where villagers have lost their land and their livelihoods is high. Conflicts could easily develop between investor and host countries. These acquisitions represent a potential investment in agriculture in developing countries of an estimated $50 billion. But it could take many years to realize any substantial production gains. The public infrastructure for modern market-oriented agriculture does not yet exist in most of Africa. In some countries it will take years just to build the roads and ports needed to bring in agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and to export farm products. Beyond that, modern agriculture requires its own infrastructure: machine sheds, grain-drying equipment, silos, fertilizer storage sheds, fuel storage facilities, equipment repair and maintenance services, well-drilling equipment, irrigation pumps, and energy to power the pumps. Overall, development of the land acquired to date appears to be moving very slowly. So how much will all this expand world food output? We don't know, but the World Bank analysis indicates that only 37 percent of the projects will be devoted to food crops. Most of the land bought up so far will be used to produce biofuels and other industrial crops. Even if some of these projects do eventually boost land productivity, who will benefit? If virtually all the inputs -- the farm equipment, the fertilizer, the pesticides, the seeds -- are brought in from abroad and if all the output is shipped out of the country, it will contribute little to the host country's economy. At best, locals may find work as farm laborers, but in highly mechanized operations, the jobs will be few. At worst, impoverished countries like Mozambique and Sudan will be left with less land and water with which to feed their already hungry populations. Thus far the land grabs have contributed more to stirring unrest than to expanding food production. And this rich country-poor country divide could grow even more pronounced -- and soon. This January, a new stage in the scramble among importing countries to secure food began to unfold when South Korea, which imports 70 percent of its grain, announced that it was creating a new public-private entity that will be responsible for acquiring part of this grain. With an initial office in Chicago, the plan is to bypass the large international trading firms by buying grain directly from U.S. farmers. As the Koreans acquire their own grain elevators, they may well sign multiyear delivery contracts with farmers, agreeing to buy specified quantities of wheat, corn, or soybeans at a fixed price. Other importers will not stand idly by as South Korea tries to tie up a portion of the U.S. grain harvest even before it gets to market. The enterprising Koreans may soon be joined by China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and other leading importers. Although South Korea's initial focus is the United States, far and away the world's largest grain exporter, it may later consider brokering deals with Canada, Australia, Argentina, and other major exporters. This is happening just as China may be on the verge of entering the U.S. market as a potentially massive importer of grain. With China's 1.4 billion increasingly affluent consumers starting to compete with U.S. consumers for the U.S. grain harvest, cheap food, seen by many as an American birthright, may be coming to an end. No one knows where this intensifying competition for food supplies will go, but the world seems to be moving away from the international cooperation that evolved over several decades following World War II to an every-country-for-itself philosophy. Food nationalism may help secure food supplies for individual affluent countries, but it does little to enhance world food security. Indeed, the low-income countries that host land grabs or import grain will likely see their food situation deteriorate.

**Extinction**

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Despite the global food crisis of 2007–8, the coming famine hasn’t happened yet. It is a looming planetary emergency whose interlocked causes and deeper ramifications the world has barely begun to absorb, let alone come to grips with. Experts predict that the crisis will peak by the middle of the twenty-first century; it is arriving even faster than climate change. Yet there is still time to forestall catastrophe. The first foreshocks were discernible soon after the turn of the millennium. In the years from 2001 to 2008 the world steadily consumed more grain that it produced, triggering rising prices, growing shortages, and even rationing and famine in poorer countries. The global stockpile of grain shrank from more than a hundred days’ supply of food to less than fifty days’. It was the difference between a comfortable surplus and alarming shortages in some countries; it was accompanied by soaring prices — and the resulting fury of ordinary citizens. It was mainly this simple fact of each year consuming slightly more than we grew that panicked the long-quiescent grain markets, triggering a cycle of price increases that sent shockwaves through consumers in all countries, governments, and global institutions such as the United Nations, its FAO, and the World Bank. All of a sudden food security, having been off the po liti cal menu for de cades, was heading the bill of fare — not even to be entirely eclipsed by the spectacular crash of the world’s financial markets that followed soon afterward. That the world was suddenly short of food — after almost a half century of abundance, extravagant variety, year-round availability, and the cheapest real food prices enjoyed by many consumers in the whole of human history — seemed unimaginable. On tele vi sion celebrity chefs extolled the virtue of devouring animals and plants increasingly rare in the wild; magazines larded their pages with mouth-watering recipes to tempt their overfed readers’ jaded appetites; food corporations churned out novel concoctions of salt, sugar, fat, emulsifier, extender, and dye; fast-food outlets disgorged floods of dubious nutrition to fatten an already overweight 1.4 billion people. And, in the third world, nearly fifteen thousand children continued to die quietly and painfully each day from hunger-related disease. “A brutal convergence of events has hit an unprepared global market, and grain prices are sky high. The world’s poor suffer most,” stated the Washington Post. “The food price shock now roiling world markets is destabilizing governments, igniting street riots and threatening to send a new wave of hunger rippling through the world’s poorest nations. It is outpacing even the Soviet grain emergency of 1972–75, when world food prices rose 78 percent.” Between 2005 and 2008 food prices rose on average by 80 percent, according to the FAO. “Rocketing food prices — some of which have more than doubled in two years — have sparked riots in numerous countries recently,” Time magazine reported. “Millions are reeling . . . and governments are scrambling to staunch a fast-moving crisis before it spins out of control. From Mexico to Pakistan, protests have turned violent.” Time attributed events to booming demand from newly affluent Chinese and Indian consumers, freak weather events that had reduced harvests, the spike in oil prices, and growth in the production of farm biofuels. In early 2007, thousands of Mexicans turned out on the streets in protest over the “tortilla crisis” — savage increases in the cost of maize flour. Over the ensuing months food riots or public unrest over food prices were reported by media in Haiti, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, India, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Cameroon, Morocco, Mauritania, Somalia, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Kenya, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Mexico, and Zimbabwe. In Haiti riots forced the resignation of the prime minister and obliged the United Nations World Food Programme to provide emergency aid to 2.3 million people. The new government of Nepal tottered. Mexico announced plans to freeze the prices of 150 staple foods. The U.K. Guardian reported riots in fifteen countries; the New York Times and the World Bank both said thirty. The FAO declared that thirty-seven countries faced food crises due to conflict or disaster at the start of 2008, adding that 1.5 billion people living in degraded lands were at risk of starvation. The Economist magazine succinctly labeled it a “silent tsunami.” The rhetoric reflected the sudden, adventitious nature of the crisis. “It is an apocalyptic warning,” pronounced Tim Costello, the Australian head of the aid agency World Vision. “Until recently we had plenty of food: the question was distribution. The truth is because of rising oil prices, global warming and the loss of arable land, all countries that can produce food now desperately need to produce more.” “What we are witnessing is not a natural disaster — a silent tsunami or a perfect storm. It is a man-made catastrophe,” the World Bank group president Robert Zoellick advised the G8 leaders feasting in Japan. Major rice-growing countries, including India, Vietnam, China, and Cambodia, imposed export restrictions to curb rice price inflation at home. Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines began stockpiling grain while Pakistan and Rus sia raised wheat export taxes and Brazil, Indonesia, and Argentina imposed export restrictions. Guinea banned all food exports. The panic reached a peak in Asia, where rice prices soared by almost 150 percent in barely a year. “Nobody has ever seen such a jump in the price of rice,” said sixty-eight-year-old Kwanchai Gomez, the executive director of the Thai Rice Foundation. Filipino fast-food outlets voluntarily reduced customer portions by half. In Thailand, thieves secretly stripped rice paddies by night to make a fast profit. India banned the export of all non-basmati rice, and Vietnam embargoed rice exports, period, sending Thai rice prices spiraling upward by 30 percent. The giant U.S. retailer Wal-Mart rationed rice sales to customers of its Sam’s Club chain, as did some British retailers. Such mea sures did little to quell the panic, which was originally touched off by a 50 percent drop in surplus rice stocks over the previous seven years. The International Rice Research Institute attributed the crisis to loss of land to industrialization and city sprawl, the growing demand for meat in China and India, and floods or bad weather in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Vietnam, China, and Burma. By mid-2009, accelerated by the worldwide financial crash, thirtythree countries around the world were facing either “alarming” or “extremely alarming” food shortages, a billion people were eating less each day — and most of Earth’s citizens were feeling the pinch. Though food prices fell, alongside prices of stocks and most other commodities, in the subsequent months, they fell only a little — and then began to rise again. What happened in 2008 wasn’t the coming famine of the twenty-first century, merely a premonition of what lies ahead. This will not be a single event, affecting all nations and peoples equally at all times, but in one way or another it will leave no person in the world untouched. The reemergence of food scarcity occurs after de cades of plenty, accompanied by the lowest real food prices for consumers in history. These bounteous years were the consequence of a food production miracle achieved by the world’s farmers and agricultural scientists from the 1960s on — a miracle of which the urbanized world of today seems largely oblivious and which we have forgotten to renew. By the early twenty-first century, signs of complacency were in evidence. In 2003, a conference of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research in Nairobi was told, “According to the Food and Agriculture Or ga ni za tion of the United Nations, the number of foodinsecure people in developing countries fell from 920 million in 1980 to 799 million in 1999.” Even in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 food price spike, the FAO itself, along with the Or ga ni za tion for Economic Cooperation and Development, remarked, “the underlying forces that drive agricultural product supply (by and large productivity gains) will eventually outweigh the forces that determine stronger demand, both for food and feed as well as for industrial demand, most notably for biofuel production. Consequently, prices will resume their decline in real terms, though possibly not by quite as much as in the past.” For some years, reassuring statements such as these had been repeatedly aired in the food policy, overseas aid, and research worlds. Unintentionally, food scientists and policy makers were sending a signal to governments and aid donors around the world that implied, “Relax. It’s under control. We’ve fixed the problem. Food is no longer critical.” Not surprisingly, aid donors rechanneled scarce funds to other urgent priorities — and growth in crop yields sagged as the world’s foot came off the scientific accelerator. Many found the new crisis all the more mysterious for its apparent lack of an obvious trigger. Various culprits were pilloried by blameseeking politicians and media. Biofuels, after being talked up as one of the great hopes for combating climate change, quickly became a villain accused of “burning the food of the poor” and, from China to Britain, countries slammed the brakes on policies intended to encourage farmers to grow more “green fuel” from grain. According to the World Bank, biofuels could have caused as much as three-quarters of the hike in food prices. Equally to blame, according to other commentators, were oil prices, which had soared sixfold in the five years from mid-2003 to mid-2008 (although they fell again sharply as the global recession bit deep) with severe consequences for the cost of producing food, through their impact on farmer’s fuel, fertilizer, pesticide, and transportation costs. In developed countries the financial pain was high, but in developing nations it was agony: farmers simply could not afford to buy fertilizer and crop yields began to slip. In Thailand rice farmers quietly parked their new but unaffordable tractors in their sheds and went back to plowing with buffalo; buffalo breeders experienced a bonanza. “Energy and agricultural prices have become increasingly intertwined,” commented Joachim von Braun, the head of the International Food Policy Research Institute. “High energy prices have made agricultural production more expensive by raising the cost of cultivation, inputs — especially fertilizers and irrigation — and transportation of inputs and outputs. In poor countries, this hinders production response to high output prices. The main new link between energy and agricultural prices, however, is the competition of grain and oilseed land for feed and food, versus their use for bio energy.” Speculators, fleeing crumbling financial markets and discovering an unlikely haven in booming agricultural commodities, were a favorite target of media ire: “Food was becoming the new gold. Investors fleeing Wall Street’s mortgage-related strife plowed hundreds of millions of dollars into grain futures, driving prices up even more. By Christmas (2007), a global panic was building,” reported the Washington Post. In developing nations, traders and grain dealers were accused of buying up surplus stocks and hoarding them to drive the prices higher still. In the Philippines the government threatened hoarders with charges of economic sabotage and sent armed soldiers to supervise the distribution of subsidized grain. Retirement and hedge funds, casting about for something to invest in that wasn’t going to hell in a handbasket, also jumped on farm commodities and even agribusiness enterprises — areas such investors traditionally shun. Many saw the crisis as simply a result of the growth of human population, the inexorable climb from 3 billion people in 1960 to 6.8 billion by 2008 — the hundred million more mouths we have to feed in each succeeding year. Others ascribed it chiefly to burgeoning appetites in China and India, which had in a matter of five years or so together added the consumer equivalent of Eu rope to global demand for food as their emergent middle classes indulged in the delights of diets containing far more meat, poultry, dairy, and fish than ever before. In China, meat consumption trebled in less than fifteen years, requiring a tenfold increase in the grain needed to feed the animals and fish. One way to visualize the issue is that growth in global food production of 1–1.5 percent a year has more or less kept pace with growth in population — but has fallen short of meeting the growth in demand. One explanation for this is that farmers around the world have not responded by increasing the area of land they plant and harvest or raising their crop yields so rapidly as in the past. The big question is: why? Some blamed the weather. Portentously, many were quick to discern the looming shadow of climate change in the run of droughts, floods, and other natural mishaps that had disrupted global farm production across most continents in recent years. In eastern Australia a ten-year drought slashed grain production and all but obliterated the rice industry; the unpre ce dented draining of Australia’s food bowl, the Murray-Darling Basin, threatened to eliminate fruit, vegetable, and livestock industries reliant on irrigation. Similar hardship faced producers across sub-Sahelian Africa. Floods in China and along the Mississippi River wreaked local havoc with grain production. In Burma, Cyclone Nargis flattened the Irawaddy Delta rice crop, propelling Asian prices into a fresh spiral. Heat waves in California and torrential rains in India added to perceptions — heightened by media reportage — that the climate was running amok. Other commentators sought villains among the world’s governments, blaming protectionism and hidden trade barriers, farm subsidies, food price controls or taxes, environmental and health restrictions, the ensnaring of farmers in snarls of red tape, along with the perennial failure of trade negotiators to open up global trade in agricultural products. Supermarkets and globalization of the food trade came in for flak, especially from the po liti cal left and from farmers themselves, for driving down farm commodity prices and thus discouraging growers from increasing production. Economic observers read the crisis as primarily due to weaker growth in food production at a time of strong growth in consumer demand, especially in China and India and among affluent populations worldwide. The Green Revolution, whose technologies had delivered the last great surge in global food production in the 1970s and 1980s seemed to be fizzling out, a view supported by the disturbing slide in crop yield advances. Yields of the major crops of wheat, maize, and rice had once increased by as much as 5 and even 10 percent a year — now they were increasing by 1 percent or nothing at all. In the overheated economy of the early twenty-first century, farm costs had soared along with oil prices, hindering farmers from adopting newer, but costlier and more energyintensive, technologies. In advanced countries, some scientists whispered, we might actually be approaching the physical limits of the ability of plants to turn sunlight into edible food. In the general hunt for someone to blame for the short-term food crisis, a more profound truth was being obscured — that the challenge is far deeper, longer-term, and more intractable than most people, and certainly most governments, understand. It stems from the magnifying and interacting constraints on food production generated as civilization presses harder against the finite bounds of the planet’s natural resources, combined with human appetites that seem to know no bounds. This challenge is more pressing even than climate change. A climate crisis may emerge over de cades. A food crisis can explode within weeks — and kill within days. But the two are also interlocked. “If the world were to experience a year of bad weather similar to that experienced in 1972, the current ‘food crisis’ would pale in comparison to the crisis that would arise as a result. This should be taken as a warning that advance planning ought to be done if total chaos is to be avoided,” observes the resource analyst Bruce Sundquist. The character of human conflict has also changed: since the early 1990s, more wars have been triggered by disputes over food, land, and water than over mere political or ethnic differences. This should not surprise us: people have fought over the means of survival for most of history. But in the abbreviated reports on the nightly media, and even in the rarefied realms of government policy, the focus is almost invariably on the players — the warring national, ethnic, or religious factions — rather than on the play, the deeper subplots building the tensions that ignite conflict. Caught up in these are groups of ordinary, desperate people fearful that there is no longer sufficient food, land, and water to feed their children — and believing that they must fight “the others” to secure them. At the same time, the number of refugees in the world doubled, many of them escaping from conflicts and famines precipitated by food and resource shortages. Governments in troubled regions tottered and fell. The coming famine is planetary because it involves both the immediate effects of hunger on directly affected populations in heavily populated regions of the world in the next forty years — and also the impacts of war, government failure, refugee crises, shortages, and food price spikes that will affect all human beings, no matter who they are or where they live. It is an emergency because unless it is solved, billions will experience great hardship, and not only in the poorer regions. Mike Murphy, one of the world’s most progressive dairy farmers, with operations in Ireland, New Zealand, and North and South America, succinctly summed it all up: “Global warming gets all the publicity but the real imminent threat to the human race is starvation on a massive scale. Taking a 10–30 year view, I believe that food shortages, famine and huge social unrest are probably the greatest threat the human race has ever faced. I believe future food shortages are a far bigger world threat than global warming.” The coming famine is also complex, because it is driven not by one or two, or even a half dozen, factors but rather by the confluence of many large and profoundly intractable causes that tend to amplify one another. This means that it cannot easily be remedied by “silver bullets” in the form of technology, subsidies, or single-country policy changes, because of the synergetic character of the things that power it. To see where the answers may lie, we need to explore each of the main drivers. On the demand side the chief drivers are: Population. Although the rate of growth in human numbers is slowing, the present upward trend of 1.5 percent (one hundred million more people) per year points to a population of around 9.2 billion in 2050 — 3 billion more than in 2000. Most of this expansion will take place in poorer countries and in tropical/subtropical regions. In countries where birth rates are falling, governments are bribing their citizens with subsidies to have more babies in an effort to address the age imbalance. Consumer demand. The first thing people do as they climb out of poverty is to improve their diet. Demand for protein foods such as meat, milk, fish, and eggs from consumers with better incomes, mainly in India and China but also in Southeast Asia and Latin America, is rising rapidly. This in turn requires vastly more grain to feed the animals and fish. Overfed rich societies continue to gain weight. The average citizen of Planet Earth eats one-fifth more calories than he or she did in the 1960s — a “food footprint” growing larger by the day. Population and demand. This combination of population growth with expansion in consumer demand indicates a global requirement for food by 2050 that will be around 70–100 percent larger than it is today. Population and demand are together rising at about 2 percent a year, whereas food output is now increasing at only about 1 percent a year. These demand-side factors could probably be satisfied by the world adopting tactics similar to those of the 1960s, when the Green Revolution in farming technology was launched, were it not for the many constraints on the supply side that are now emerging to hinder or prevent such a solution: Water crisis. Put simply, civilization is running out of freshwater. Farmers presently use about 70 percent of the world’s readily available freshwater to grow food. However, increasingly megacities, with their huge thirst for water for use in homes, industry, and waste disposal, are competing with farmers for this finite resource and, by 2050, these uses could swallow half or more of the world’s available freshwater at a time when many rivers, lakes, and aquifers will be drying up. Unless major new sources or savings are found, farmers will have about half of the world’s currently available freshwater with which to grow twice the food. Land scarcity. The world is running out of good farmland. A quarter of all land is now so degraded that it is scarcely capable of yielding food. At the same time, cities are sprawling, smothering the world’s most fertile soil in concrete and asphalt, while their occupants fan out in search of cheap land for recreation that diverts the best food-producing areas from agriculture. A third category of land is poisoned by toxic industrial pollution. Much former urban food production has now ceased. The emerging global dearth of good farmland represents another severe limit on increasing food production. Nutrient losses. Civilization is hemorrhaging nutrients — substances essential to all life. Annual losses in soil erosion alone probably exceed all the nutrients applied as fertilizer worldwide. The world’s finite nutrient supplies may already have peaked. Half the fertilizer being used is wasted. In most societies, up to half the food produced is trashed or lost; so too are most of the nutrients in urban waste streams. The global nutrient cycle, which has sustained humanity throughout our history, has broken down. Energy dilemma. Advanced farming depends entirely on fossil fuels, which are likely to become very scarce and costly within a generation. At present farmers have few alternative means of producing food other than to grow fuel on their farms — which will reduce food output by 10–20 percent. Many farmers respond to higher costs simply by using less fertilizer or fuel — and so cutting yields. Driven by high energy prices and concerns about climate change, the world is likely to burn around 400 million tonnes (441 million U.S. tons) of grain as biofuels by 2020 — the equivalent of the entire global rice harvest. Oceans. Marine scientists have warned that ocean fish catches could collapse by the 2040s due to overexploitation of wild stocks. Coral reefs — whose fish help feed about five hundred million people — face decimation under global warming. The world’s oceans are slowly acidifying as carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels dissolves out of the atmosphere, threatening ocean food chains. Fish farms are struggling with pollution and sediment runoff from the land. The inability of the fish sector to meet its share of a doubling in world food demand will throw a heavier burden onto land-based meat industries. Technology. For three de cades the main engine of the modern food miracle, the international scientific research that boosted crop yields, has been neglected, leading to a decline in productivity gains. Farmers worldwide are heading into a major technology pothole, with less new knowledge available in the medium run to help them to increase output. Climate. The climate is changing: up to half the planet may face regular drought by the end of the century. “Unnatural disasters” — storms, floods, droughts, and sea-level rise — are predicted to become more frequent and intense, with adventitious impacts on food security, refugee waves, and conflict. Economics, politics, and trade. Trade barriers and farm subsidies continue to distort world markets, sending the wrong price signals to farmers and discouraging investment in agriculture and its science. The globalization of food has helped drive down prices received by farmers. Speculators have destabilized commodity markets, making it riskier for farmers to make production decisions. Some countries discourage or ban food exports and others tax them, adding to food insecurity. Others pay their farmers to grow fuel instead of food. A sprawling web of health, labor, and environmental regulation is limiting farmers’ freedom to farm. The collapse in world economic conditions in late 2008 and 2009 has changed the prices of many things, including land, food, fuel, and fertilizer — but has not altered the fact that demand for food continues to grow while limits on its production multiply. Indeed, the economic crash exacerbated hunger among the world’s poor, and has not altered the fundamentals of climate change, water scarcity, population growth, land degradation, or nutrient or oil depletion. In early 2009 a report by Chatham House, a think tank focused on international affairs, observed that a lower food price “does not mean that policy-makers around the world can start to breathe a sigh of relief. . . . [E]ven at their somewhat diminished levels current prices remain acutely problematic for low-income import-dependent countries and for poor people all over the world. The World Bank estimates that higher food prices have increased the number of undernourished people by as much as 100 million from its pre-price-spike level of 850 million.” In the medium and longer term, the report warned, food prices were poised to rise again. “Although many policy-makers have taken a degree of comfort from a recent OECD-FAO report on the world’s agricultural outlook to 2017 . . . the report largely overlooked the potential impact of long-term resource scarcity trends, notably climate change, energy security and falling water availability.” To sum it all up, the challenge facing the world’s 1.8 billion women and men who grow our food is to double their output of food — using far less water, less land, less energy, and less fertilizer. They must accomplish this on low and uncertain returns, with less new technology available, amid more red tape, economic disincentives, and corrupted markets, and in the teeth of spreading drought. Achieving this will require something not far short of a miracle. Yet humans have done it before and, resilient species that we are, we can do it again. This time, however, it won’t just be a problem for farmers, scientists, and policy makers. It will be a challenge involving every single one of us, in our daily lives, our habits, and our influence at the ballot box and at the supermarket. It will be the greatest test of our global humanity and our wisdom we have yet faced

**Causes Pakistani instability**

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Pakistan is a declared nuclear power. The Pakistan military is the world’s seventh-largest armed force, and is quite capable of addressing all but the most serious threats. Strong defense might have helped in achieving national security. However, security at the individual level remains quite questionable. According to recent reports from the UN World Food Program, almost 50 percent of the Pakistani population is food-insecure. Food inflation reached its peak in 2007–08 when it soared to 36 percent. Steady increases in the number of food-insecure individuals have led to class conflict and violence between “haves” and “have-nots,” which result in social instability. According to research carried out in 2003 by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute of Pakistan, in collaboration with the World Food Program, 52 percent of the total rural population in 80 out of Pakistan’s 120 districts is food-insecure. The 13 most food-insecure districts include Tharparkar (Pakistan’s largest desert), Dera Bugti (one of the most troubled districts in Baluchistan, where nationalist leader Akbar Bugti was assassinated during President Pervez Musharraf’s regime), North Waziristan, Musa Khel, Kharan, Shangla, Kohistan, South Waziristan, Diamer, Hangu, Bolan, Upper Dir, and Khyber. The international community might not have heard of these districts in the context of food insecurity. However, many people would easily recall that these districts are perceived as the “axis of evil” within Pakistan. There is no empirical evidence to prove that food insecurity is the only cause of militancy in the above-mentioned districts. However, it is an established fact that food insecurity leads to violence and conflict. Pakistani armed forces have already started a full-scale operation against militants in North Waziristan, Shangla, Kohistan, South Waziristan, Hangu, Upper Dir, and Khyber. Whether this operation will be helpful in eliminating the social factors that partly invoke militancy is anybody’s guess. Recognizing food insecurity as a major cause of militancy and violence, many analysts believe that in Pakistan, a “mullah-marxist nexus” is operating where religious forces are exploiting the (anti-elite) feelings of lower- and lower-middle-class food-insecure people, motivating unemployed youth to commit heinous crimes such as suicide attacks against innocent people. Here it is pertinent to mention that most suicide bombers have been young (between 15 and 24 years of age). Compromised security at one level (individual security in Pakistan’s case) compromises security at each of the other levels (national, regional, and global). Food scarcity heightens the potential for conflict, which translates into a security threat. Individual cases of relative hunger, marginalization, and poverty can turn into collective deprivation. This collective deprivation can take on a gender, class, or national identity and lead to conflict and violence.

**Goes nuclear**

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But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as ¶ many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all. Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world. The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself. Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spines of those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster. We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

**US is key**

Bill Witherell 12 is Cumberland’s Chief Global Economist, “What the Threat of a Global Food Crisis Means for World Markets,” 8-12-12, <http://www.businessinsider.com/what-the-threat-of-a-global-food-crisis-means-for-world-markets-2012-8>, Accessed Date: 3-6-13 y2k

The global food crisis of 2007-2008 is threatening to repeat in the coming months, as the worst drought in 50 years devastates the US corn crop, with 51% of the crop rated "Poor/very poor" by the US Department of Agriculture. This crop is said to be on a par with that of 1988 crop, the worst in the past thirty years. Note that the US is the top producer and exporter of corn. Our account for nearly half of the world's corn and also a third of the world's soybeans, the harvest for which will be the lowest in five years. The director-general of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization, José Graziano da Silva, characterizes the present global food situation as "precarious," as do experts we have contacted. The food crisis in 2008 led to riots in some 30, mainly very poor, countries and immeasurable hardships in many more. Following that crisis, governments vowed to act to improve global food security, including at a G8 Summit in Italy in 2009. The followup is reported to have been a mixture of some gains and some disappointments. Among the gains are the provision of improved strains of some crops and increased agricultural aid. There have been disappointments in the areas of humanitarian food aid and a failure to agree on binding agreements to regulate food export bans. The 2008 crisis was made more severe by export restrictions by some important agricultural producers, including Russia and the Ukraine.

**Conventional ag fails**

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Current food system collapsing Our agriculture and food system has been showing signs of collapse [4], with world grain yields falling most years since 2000, and reserves at their lowest in 50 years [5]. In too many major croplands of the world, industrial farming practices have severely depleted underground water, dried out rivers and lakes, eroded topsoil, and decimated wild life with fertilizers and pesticides run-offs. Most alarming is the recent disappearance of bees and other pollinators (see [6] Mystery of Disappearing Honeybees and other articles in the series, SiS 44). At the same time, world oil production has passed its peak [7] Oil Running Out (SiS 25) with the peak of natural gas not far behind [8]. Conventional industrial agriculture is heavily dependent on fossil fuels as well as water. In addition, climate change has emerged as a major threat to agricultural productivity. Direct field monitoring showed that crop yields fell 10 percent for each ˚C rise in night-time temperature during the growing season [9]. The International Food Policy Research Institute predicts that wheat yields in developing countries will drop 30 percent by 2050, while irrigated rice yields will drop 15 percent [10]. Climate change may hit the developing world harder, but the developed world is not immune. Increasing frequencies of drought, flood, and storm associated with climate change will devastate crops and livestock, and spells of extreme heat are also damaging as plants will start to deteriorate at about 32 ˚C. The yields of corn, soybeans and cotton could fall by 30 to 46 percent under the slowest warming scenario, or 63 to 82 percent under the fastest warming scenario.

**Cost-effective solar is key to sustainable agriculture.**

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Agriculture is an important part of the U.S. economy and culture, and it can play an important role in distributed generation of energy. This report identifies the opportunities for solar energy use in U.S. agriculture. Section 2 provides an overview of energy use in agriculture. Section 3 presents the solar resource potential, and Section 4 discusses the types of solar energy available. Section 5 displays the solar energy use and potential in the U.S., and Section 6 provides selected examples. Financial considerations for solar energy adoption are examined in Section 7. U.S. policies that can support solar energy use in agriculture are compiled in Section 8. Section 9 concludes the report. A glossary with helpful definitions is available at the end of the report, as is a compilation of useful links on solar energy. Farmers have the tradition of being stewards of the land, and their investment in renewable energy supports their role of protecting the land, air, and water. Solar energy, like other renewables, offers an opportunity to stabilize energy costs, decrease pollution and greenhouse gases (GHGs), and delay the need for electric grid infrastructure improvements (Brown and Elliott, 2005). Solar energy systems have low maintenance costs, and the fuel is free once the higher initial cost of the system is recovered through subsidies and energy savings (from reduced or avoided energy costs). According to the first USDA On-Farm Energy Production Survey, solar panels have been the most prominent way to produce on-farm renewable energy (USDA, 2011). Agriculture hosted some of the first terrestrial photovoltaic (PV) applications of solar energy, as it found uses for solar in remote locations around ranches and farms. Early on, solar electric made economic sense for a number of low power agricultural needs when running utility lines to a specific location was either not possible or too expensive. Kerosene, diesel, and propane have traditionally been used in agricultural operations to power generators when grid connection was not available. However use of these fuels has problems: cost of transporting fuel, volatility of fuel costs, fuel spillage, noisy generators, noxious fumes, and high maintenance needs. The disadvantages of using propane or bottled gas to heat water for pen cleaning or in crop processing applications, or to heat air for crop drying, are the cost of fuel and transportation, along with safety concerns. For many agricultural needs, solar energy provides a good alternative. Modern, well-designed, simple-to-maintain, and cost-effective solar systems can provide energy that is needed when and where it is needed. Today, distributed generation, backup in the case of utility grid outage, and net metering present further opportunities for grid-connected solar energy use in agricultural settings. Larger solar installations have been developed; still, in agriculture solar energy generation has been small when compared to wind energy generation and to date has not surpassed 1Megawatt (MW). Small solar PV installations are below 10 kilowatt (kW), small commercial are 10kW-40kW, and large commercial PV installations range from 40kW-1MW. According to USDA (2011) the average size of a PV system for U.S. farms is 4.5kW. Solar thermal (low-temperature thermal), which can be used in agricultural operations for hot water needs or for space heating, is overshadowed from PV installations. The residential sector dominates this market, but the potential in agricultural settings is large.

**Key to productivity**

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An emerging scientific consensus that a shift to small scale sustainable agriculture and localized food systems will address most, if not all the underlying causes of deteriorating agricultural productivity as well as the conservation of natural soil and water resources while saving the climate To substantially improve living standards, access to modern energy is also crucial. Small agro-ecological farms are known to be highly productive, and are ideally served by new renewable energies that can be generated and used on site, and in off-grid situations most often encountered in developing countries A model that explicitly integrates sustainable farming and renewable energies in a circular economy patterned after nature could compensate, in the best case scenario, for the carbon emissions and energy consumption of the entire nation while revitalising and stimulating local economies and employment opportunities

### 1AC---Advantage 2- Leadership

**Tech innovation solves great-power war**

Mark Taylor 4 is Professor of Political Science – Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Politics of Technological Change: International Relations versus Domestic Institutions”, 4-1, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/46554792/Taylor>, Accessed date: 12-3-12 y2k.

Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR), affecting almost every aspect of the sub-field. 2 First and foremost, a nation’s technological capability has a significant effect on its economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national technological capabilities necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in calculations of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nation’s trade profile, affecting which products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base their production facilities. 3 Third, insofar as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital, a nation’s technological ability will also affect international financial flows and who has power over them. 4 Thus, in broad theoretical terms, technological change is important to the study of IR because of its overall implications for both the relative and absolute power of states. And if theory alone does not convince, then history also tells us that nations on the technological ascent generally experience a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence, such as Britain during the first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century. 5 Conversely, great powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and fade from influence on international scene. 6 This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines international politics, but rather that shifts in both relative and absolute technological capability have a major impact on international relations, and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars. Indeed, the importance of technological innovation to international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists. Technology is rarely the sole or overriding causal variable in any given IR theory, but a broad overview of the major theoretical debates reveals the ubiquity of technological causality. For example, from Waltz to Posen, almost all Realists have a place for technology in their explanations of international politics. 7 At the very least, they describe it as an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations, or an indirect source of military doctrine. And for some, like Gilpin quoted above, technology is the very cornerstone of great power domination, and its transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics. 8 Jervis tells us that the balance of offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war. 9 Walt agrees, arguing that technological change can alter a state’s aggregate power, and thereby affect both alliance formation and the international balance of threats. 10 Liberals are less directly concerned with technological change, but they must admit that by raising or lowering the costs of using force, technological progress affects the rational attractiveness of international cooperation and regimes. 11 Technology also lowers information & transactions costs and thus increases the applicability of international institutions, a cornerstone of Liberal IR theory. 12 And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and information, technological change can lead to Keohane’s interdependence 13 or Thomas Friedman et al’s globalization. 14 Meanwhile, over at the “third debate”, Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue, from Katzenstein’s “cultural norms” which shape security concerns and thereby affect technological innovation; 15 to Wendt’s “stripped down technological determinism” in which technology inevitably drives nations to form a world state. 16 However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing that new technology changes people’s identities within society, and sometimes even creates new cross-national constituencies, thereby affecting international politics. 17 Of course, Marxists tend to see technology as determining all social relations and the entire course of history, though they describe mankind’s major fault lines as running between economic classes rather than nation-states. 18 Finally, Buzan & Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place

**Heg solves extinction.**

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t is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding. As a result, the vector of structure-building connectivity shifted from trans-Atlantic to trans-Pacific. But if the connectivity push of the past several decades has been from West to East, with little connectivity extended to the South outside of the narrow trade of energy and raw materials, the current connectivity dynamic is dramatically different. Now, the dominant trends are: first, the East cross-connecting back to the West via financial and investment flows as well as Asian companies "going global"; and second, the East creating vast new connectivity networks with the South through South-South trade and investment. The challenge here is how to adjust great-power politics to these profound forces of structural change. Because of the West's connectivity to the East, we are by extension becoming more deeply connected to the unstable South, with China as the primary conduit. Meanwhile, America's self-exhausting post-Sept. 11 unilateralist bender triggered the illusion -- all the rage these days -- of a G-Zero, post-American world. The result, predictably enough for manic-depressive America, is that we've sworn off any overall responsibility for the South, even as we retain the right to go anywhere and kill any individuals -- preferably with flying robots -- that we deem immediately threatening to our narrowly defined national security interests. The problem with this approach is that China has neither the intention nor the ability to step up and play anything resembling a responsible Leviathan over the restive South, where globalization's advance -- again, with a Chinese face -- produces a lot of near-term instability even as it builds the basis for longer-term stability. Libya is a perfect example of where the world is now stuck: America is very reticent to get involved militarily, while China, for the first time in its history, engages in long-range military operations to evacuate its workforce there. Meanwhile, the expanding civil war rages on, to everyone's moral and economic distress. The point is not that America must invade Libya pronto to keep the world as we know it from coming to an end. But if the United States and the West sit by while the Rest, risers that they are, manage nothing more than pious warnings about needlessly butting in, then we all run the risk of collectively making the post-American, G-Zero, do-nothing storyline a self-fulfilling prophecy. While that alone won't stop the world from spinning, if it persists as a pattern, globalization will slide down another path: one of regionalism, spheres of influence and neocolonial burdens that are intuitively hoarded by great powers grown increasingly suspicious of one another. And if you know your history, that should make you nervous.

**Decline causes transition war and lashout**

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Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict. None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's collapse would probably come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

**Globalization solves conflict**

**Panitchpakdi 4**—Supachai Panitchpakdi is the UN Conference on Trade and Development General, “American Leadership and the World Trade Organization: What is the Alternative?”, 26 February 2004, <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spsp_e/spsp22_>

e.htm Accessed date: 8-27-12 y2k

I can sum up my message today in three sentences: The United States, more than any single country, created the world trading system. The US has never had more riding on the strength of that system. And US leadership — especially in the current Doha trade talks — is indispensable to the system's success. It is true that as the WTO's importance to the world economy increases, so too does the challenge of making it work: there are more countries, more issues, trade is in the spot light as never before. But the fiction that there is an alternative to the WTO — or to US leadership — is both naïve and dangerous. Naïve because it fails to recognize that multilateralism has become more — not less — important to advancing US interests. Dangerous because it risks undermining the very objectives the US seeks — freer trade, stronger rules, a more open and secure world economy. The Doha Round is a crucial test. The core issues — services, agriculture, and industrial tariffs — are obviously directly relevant to the US. America is highly competitive in services — the fastest growing sector of the world economy, and where the scope for liberalization is greatest. In agriculture too the US is competitive across many commodities — but sky-high global barriers and subsidies impede and distort agricultural trade. Industrial tariffs also offer scope for further liberalization — especially in certain markets and sectors. But what is at stake in these talks is more than the economic benefits that would flow from a successful deal. The real issue is the relevance of the multilateral trading system. Its expanded rules, broader membership, and binding dispute mechanism means that the new WTO — created less than ten years ago — is pivotal to international economic relations. But this means that the costs of failure are also higher — with ramifications that can be felt more widely. Advancing the Doha agenda would confirm the WTO as the focal point for global trade negotiations, and as the key forum for international economic cooperation. The credibility of the institution would be greatly enhanced. But if the Doha negotiations stumble, doubts may grow, not just about the WTO's effectiveness, but about the future of multilateralism in trade. This should be a major concern to the US for two reasons: First, the US is now integrated with the world economy as never before. A quarter of US GDP is tied to international trade, up from 10 per cent in 1970 — the largest such increase of any developed economy over this period. A third of US growth since 1990 has been generated by trade. And America's trade is increasingly global in scope — 37 per cent with Canada and Mexico, 23 per cent with Europe, 27 per cent with Asia. Last year alone, exports to China rose by almost 30 per cent. The US has also grown more reliant on the rules of the multilateral system to keep world markets open. Not only has it initiated more WTO dispute proceedings than any other country — some 75 since 1995 — according to USTR it has also won or successfully settled most of the cases it has brought. The point is this: even the US cannot achieve prosperity on its own; it is increasingly dependent on international trade, and the rules-based economic order that underpins it. As the biggest economy, largest trader and one of the most open markets in the world, it is axiomatic that the US has the greatest interest in widening and deepening the multilateral system. Furthermore, expanding international trade through the WTO generates increased global prosperity, in turn creating yet more opportunities for the US economy. The second point is that strengthening the world trading system is essential to America's wider global objectives. Fighting terrorism, reducing poverty, improving health, integrating China and other countries in the global economy — all of these issues are linked, in one way or another, to world trade. This is not to say that trade is the answer to all America's economic concerns; only that meaningful solutions are inconceivable without it. The world trading system is the linchpin of today's global order — underpinning its security as well as its prosperity. A successful WTO is an example of how multilateralism can work. Conversely, if it weakens or fails, much else could fail with it. This is something which the US — at the epicentre of a more interdependent world — cannot afford to ignore. These priorities must continue to guide US policy — as they have done since the Second World War. America has been the main driving force behind eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, including the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO. The US — together with the EU — was instrumental in launching the latest Doha Round two years ago. Likewise, the recent initiative, spearheaded by Ambassador Zoellick, to re-energize the negotiations and move them towards a successful conclusion is yet another example of how essential the US is to the multilateral process — signalling that the US remains committed to further liberalization, that the Round is moving, and that other countries have a tangible reason to get on board. The reality is this: when the US leads the system can move forward; when it withdraws, the system drifts. The fact that US leadership is essential, does not mean it is easy. As WTO rules have expanded, so too has as the complexity of the issues the WTO deals with — everything from agriculture and accounting, to tariffs and telecommunication. The WTO is also exerting huge gravitational pull on countries to join — and participate actively — in the system. The WTO now has 146 Members — up from just 23 in 1947 — and this could easily rise to 170 or more within a decade. Emerging powers like China, Brazil, and India rightly demand a greater say in an institution in which they have a growing stake. So too do a rising number of voices outside the system as well. More and more people recognize that the WTO matters. More non-state actors — businesses, unions, environmentalists, development NGOs — want the multilateral system to reflect their causes and concerns. A decade ago, few people had even heard of the GATT. Today the WTO is front page news. A more visible WTO has inevitably become a more politicized WTO. The sound and fury surrounding the WTO's recent Ministerial Meeting in Cancun — let alone Seattle — underline how challenging managing the WTO can be. But these challenges can be exaggerated. They exist precisely because so many countries have embraced a common vision. Countries the world over have turned to open trade — and a rules-based system — as the key to their growth and development. They agreed to the Doha Round because they believed their interests lay in freer trade, stronger rules, a more effective WTO. Even in Cancun the great debate was whether the multilateral trading system was moving fast and far enough — not whether it should be rolled back. Indeed, it is critically important that we draw the right conclusions from Cancun — which are only now becoming clearer. The disappointment was that ministers were unable to reach agreement. The achievement was that they exposed the risks of failure, highlighted the need for North-South collaboration, and — after a period of introspection — acknowledged the inescapable logic of negotiation. Cancun showed that, if the challenges have increased, it is because the stakes are higher. The bigger challenge to American leadership comes from inside — not outside — the United States. In America's current debate about trade, jobs and globalization we have heard a lot about the costs of liberalization. We need to hear more about the opportunities. We need to be reminded of the advantages of America's openness and its trade with the world — about the economic growth tied to exports; the inflation-fighting role of imports, the innovative stimulus of global competition. We need to explain that freer trade works precisely because it involves positive change — better products, better job opportunities, better ways of doing things, better standards of living. While it is true that change can be threatening for people and societies, it is equally true that the vulnerable are not helped by resisting change — by putting up barriers and shutting out competition. They are helped by training, education, new and better opportunities that — with the right support policies — can flow from a globalized economy. The fact is that for every job in the US threatened by imports there is a growing number of high-paid, high skill jobs created by exports. Exports supported 7 million workers a decade ago; that number is approaching around 12 million today. And these new jobs — in aerospace, finance, information technology — pay 10 per cent more than the average American wage. We especially need to inject some clarity — and facts — into the current debate over the outsourcing of services jobs. Over the next decade, the US is projected to create an average of more than 2 million new services jobs a year — compared to roughly 200,000 services jobs that will be outsourced. I am well aware that this issue is the source of much anxiety in America today. Many Americans worry about the potential job losses that might arise from foreign competition in services sectors. But it’s worth remembering that concerns about the impact of foreign competition are not new. Many of the reservations people are expressing today are echoes of what we heard in the 1970s and 1980s. But people at that time didn’t fully appreciate the power of American ingenuity. Remarkable advances in technology and productivity laid the foundation for unprecedented job creation in the 1990s and there is no reason to doubt that this country, which has shown time and again such remarkable potential for competing in the global economy, will not soon embark again on such a burst of job-creation. America's openness to service-sector trade — combined with the high skills of its workforce — will lead to more growth, stronger industries, and a shift towards higher value-added, higher-paying employment. Conversely, closing the door to service trade is a strategy for killing jobs, not saving them. Americans have never run from a challenge and have never been defeatist in the face of strong competition. Part of this challenge is to create the conditions for global growth and job creation here and around the world. I believe Americans realize what is at stake. The process of opening to global trade can be disruptive, but they recognize that the US economy cannot grow and prosper any other way. They recognize the importance of finding global solutions to shared global problems. Besides, what is the alternative to the WTO Some argue that the world's only superpower need not be tied down by the constraints of the multilateral system. They claim that US sovereignty is compromised by international rules, and that multilateral institutions limit rather than expand US influence. Americans should be deeply sceptical about these claims. Almost none of the trade issues facing the US today are any easier to solve unilaterally, bilaterally or regionally. The reality is probably just the opposite. What sense does it make — for example — to negotiate e-commerce rules bilaterally Who would be interested in disciplining agricultural subsidies in a regional agreement but not globally How can bilateral deals — even dozens of them — come close to matching the economic impact of agreeing to global free trade among 146 countries Bilateral and regional deals can sometimes be a complement to the multilateral system, but they can never be a substitute. There is a bigger danger. By treating some countries preferentially, bilateral and regional deals exclude others — fragmenting global trade and distorting the world economy. Instead of liberalizing trade — and widening growth — they carve it up. Worse, they have a domino effect: bilateral deals inevitably beget more bilateral deals, as countries left outside are forced to seek their own preferential arrangements, or risk further marginalization. This is precisely what we see happening today. There are already over two hundred bilateral and regional agreements in existence, and each month we hear of a new or expanded deal. There is a basic contradiction in the assumption that bilateral approaches serve to strengthen the multilateral, rules-based system. Even when intended to spur free trade, they can ultimately risk undermining it. This is in no one's interest, least of all the United States. America led in the creation of the multilateral system after 1945 precisely to avoid a return to hostile blocs — blocs that had done so much to fuel interwar instability and conflict. America's vision, in the words of Cordell Hull, was that “enduring peace and the welfare of nations was indissolubly connected with the friendliness, fairness and freedom of world trade”. Trade would bind nations together, making another war unthinkable. Non-discriminatory rules would prevent a return to preferential deals and closed alliances. A network of multilateral initiatives and organizations — the Marshal Plan, the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT, now the WTO — would provide the institutional bedrock for the international rule of law, not power. Underpinning all this was the idea that freedom — free trade, free democracies, the free exchange of ideas — was essential to peace and prosperity, a more just world. It is a vision that has emerged pre-eminent a half century later. Trade has expanded twenty-fold since 1950. Millions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are being lifted out of poverty, and millions more have new hope for the future. All the great powers — the US, Europe, Japan, India, China and soon Russia — are part of a rules-based multilateral trading system, greatly increasing the chances for world prosperity and peace. There is a growing realization that — in our interdependent world — sovereignty is constrained, not by multilateral rules, but by the absence of rules. All of these were America’s objectives. The US needs to be both clearer about the magnitude of what it has achieved, and more realistic about what it is trying to — and can — accomplish. Multilateralism can be slow, messy, and tortuous. But it is also indispensable to managing an increasingly integrated global economy. Multilateralism is based on the belief that all countries — even powerful countries like the United States — are made stronger and more secure through international co-operation and rules, and by working to strengthen one another from within a system, not outside of it. Multilateralism's greatest ideal is the ideal of negotiation, compromise, consensus, not coercion. As Churchill said of democracy, it is the worst possible system except for all the others. I do not believe America's long-term economic interests have changed. Nor do I believe that America's vision for a just international order has become blurred. If anything, the American vision has been sharpened since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington; sharpened by the realization that there is now a new struggle globally between the forces of openness and modernity, and the forces of separatism and reaction. More than ever, America's interests lie in an open world economy resting on the foundation of a strong, rules-based multilateral system. More and more, America's growth and security are tied to the growth and security of the world economy as a whole. American leadership today is more — not less — important to our increasingly interconnected planet. A recent successful, and much needed, example is the multilateral agreement on intellectual property rights and access to medicines for poor countries, in which the US played a pivotal role. It would be a tragic mistake if the Doha Round, which offers the world a once-in-a-generation opportunity to eliminate trade distortions, to strengthen trade rules, and open markets across the world, were allowed to founder. We need courage and the collective political will to ensure a balanced and equitable outcome. What is the alternative It is a fragmented world, with greater conflict and uncertainty. A world of the past, not the future — one that America turned away from after 1945, and that we should reject just as decisively today. America must lead. The multilateral trading system is too important to fail. The world depends on it. So does America.

**Clean tech solves leadership**

Louis Klarevas 9 is Professor for Center for Global Affairs at New York University, “Securing American Primacy While Tackling Climate Change: Toward a National Strategy of Greengemony,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/louis-klarevas/securing-american-primacy_b_393223.html>, Accessed Date: 3-17-13 y2k

As national leaders from around the world are gathering in Copenhagen, Denmark, to attend the United Nations Climate Change Conference, the time is ripe to re-assess America's current energy policies - but within the larger framework of how a new approach on the environment will stave off global warming and shore up American primacy. By not addressing climate change more aggressively and creatively, the United States is squandering an opportunity to secure its global primacy for the next few generations to come. To do this, though, the U.S. must rely on innovation to help the world escape the coming environmental meltdown. Developing the key technologies that will save the planet from global warming will allow the U.S. to outmaneuver potential great power rivals seeking to replace it as the international system's hegemon. But the greening of American strategy must occur soon. The U.S., however, seems to be stuck in time, unable to move beyond oil-centric geo-politics in any meaningful way. Often, the gridlock is portrayed as a partisan difference, with Republicans resisting action and Democrats pleading for action. This, though, is an unfair characterization as there are numerous proactive Republicans and quite a few reticent Democrats. The real divide is instead one between realists and liberals. Students of realpolitik, which still heavily guides American foreign policy, largely discount environmental issues as they are not seen as advancing national interests in a way that generates relative power advantages vis-à-vis the other major powers in the system: Russia, China, Japan, India, and the European Union. Liberals, on the other hand, have recognized that global warming might very well become the greatest challenge ever faced by mankind. As such, their thinking often eschews narrowly defined national interests for the greater global good. This, though, ruffles elected officials whose sworn obligation is, above all, to protect and promote American national interests. What both sides need to understand is that by becoming a lean, mean, green fighting machine, the U.S. can actually bring together liberals and realists to advance a collective interest which benefits every nation, while at the same time, securing America's global primacy well into the future. To do so, the U.S. must re-invent itself as not just your traditional hegemon, but as history's first ever green hegemon. Hegemons are countries that dominate the international system - bailing out other countries in times of global crisis, establishing and maintaining the most important international institutions, and covering the costs that result from free-riding and cheating global obligations. Since 1945, that role has been the purview of the United States. Immediately after World War II, Europe and Asia laid in ruin, the global economy required resuscitation, the countries of the free world needed security guarantees, and the entire system longed for a multilateral forum where global concerns could be addressed. The U.S., emerging the least scathed by the systemic crisis of fascism's rise, stepped up to the challenge and established the postwar (and current) liberal order. But don't let the world "liberal" fool you. While many nations benefited from America's new-found hegemony, the U.S. was driven largely by "realist" selfish national interests. The liberal order first and foremost benefited the U.S. With the U.S. becoming bogged down in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, running a record national debt, and failing to shore up the dollar, the future of American hegemony now seems to be facing a serious contest: potential rivals - acting like sharks smelling blood in the water - wish to challenge the U.S. on a variety of fronts. This has led numerous commentators to forecast the U.S.'s imminent fall from grace. Not all hope is lost however. With the impending systemic crisis of global warming on the horizon, the U.S. again finds itself in a position to address a transnational problem in a way that will benefit both the international community collectively and the U.S. selfishly. The current problem is two-fold. First, the competition for oil is fueling animosities between the major powers. The geopolitics of oil has already emboldened Russia in its 'near abroad' and China in far-off places like Africa and Latin America. As oil is a limited natural resource, a nasty zero-sum contest could be looming on the horizon for the U.S. and its major power rivals - a contest which threatens American primacy and global stability. Second, converting fossil fuels like oil to run national economies is producing irreversible harm in the form of carbon dioxide emissions. So long as the global economy remains oil-dependent, greenhouse gases will continue to rise. Experts are predicting as much as a 60% increase in carbon dioxide emissions in the next twenty-five years. That likely means more devastating water shortages, droughts, forest fires, floods, and storms. In other words, if global competition for access to energy resources does not undermine international security, global warming will. And in either case, oil will be a culprit for the instability. Oil arguably has been the most precious energy resource of the last half-century. But "black gold" is so 20th century. The key resource for this century will be green gold - clean, environmentally-friendly energy like wind, solar, and hydrogen power. Climate change leaves no alternative. And the sooner we realize this, the better off we will be. What Washington must do in order to avoid the traps of petropolitics is to convert the U.S. into the world's first-ever green hegemon. For starters, the federal government must drastically increase investment in energy and environmental research and development (E&E R&D). This will require a serious sacrifice, committing upwards of $40 billion annually to E&E R&D - a far cry from the few billion dollars currently being spent. By promoting a new national project, the U.S. could develop new technologies that will assure it does not drown in a pool of oil. Some solutions are already well known, such as raising fuel standards for automobiles; improving public transportation networks; and expanding nuclear and wind power sources. Others, however, have not progressed much beyond the drawing board: batteries that can store massive amounts of solar (and possibly even wind) power; efficient and cost-effective photovoltaic cells, crop-fuels, and hydrogen-based fuels; and even fusion. Such innovations will not only provide alternatives to oil, they will also give the U.S. an edge in the global competition for hegemony. If the U.S. is able to produce technologies that allow modern, globalized societies to escape the oil trap, those nations will eventually have no choice but to adopt such technologies. And this will give the U.S. a tremendous economic boom, while simultaneously providing it with means of leverage that can be employed to keep potential foes in check. The bottom-line is that the U.S. needs to become green energy dominant as opposed to black energy independent - and the best approach for achieving this is to promote a national strategy of greengemony.

**Plan bolsters US innovative leadership and competitiveness**

David Kappos 11 is Under Secretary of Commerce & Director of the USPTO, “Modernizing a 21st Century Patent Office,” April 14, 2011 <http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2011/Modernizing_a_21st_Century_Patent_Office.jsp>, Accessed Date: 3-6-13 y2k

Green Tech This smart innovation, and the infrastructure that makes it happen, writes the next chapter of American growth and that’s why we want to do everything possible to make sure that sort of intelligent technologies that your business grow here in the Bay Area. Because ultimately that story of boom and growth will be one that creates jobs and continues to find new ways to address social needs. o It’s the story of Los Gatos company, Calera, which is finding new ways to capture carbon dioxide (CO2) from the burning of fossil fuels and convert it into building materials such as cement. o By patenting a process that accelerates the absorption of gas and minerals from harmful carbon emissions and turn them into sustainable building blocks for housing construction, companies like Calera are leading the way in using smarter technologies to address everyday needs, while curbing the risk of pollutants to citizens everywhere. The ability to develop tools in the name of cause-based enterprising is an endeavor that may still require investment capital, but leaves the rest of the world inspired through human capital—and that’s an example of the sort of nuanced innovation that continues to mark excellence in American leadership. That’s why the USPTO is also proud to play a role in accelerating socially conscious technologies. Under our Green Technology Pilot Program, patent applications involving reduced greenhouse gas emissions, energy conservation and environmental quality are accelerated in their review. And at no cost to the inventor. By advancing a commitment to building a more sustainable energy future, the US Patent and Trademark Office is able to spur additional innovation and promote green collar jobs that provide our world with alternatives to harmful energy practices. This ensures that the US is not just the world’s Chief Global Competitor, but also its Chief Global Citizen. Ladies and gentleman, a changing world requires new partnerships and new solutions. As the government invests in the building blocks of innovation through new infrastructure and new research, we can establish an environment ripe for private sector investment and competitive markets, if we smartly invest in the innovation that will win America’s future. Boosts in R&D investment, public-private partnerships, and cause based technologies are all essential to 21st century business. And the Commerce Department and USPTO are leading in creating 21st century business opportunities in our country. Part of that endeavor will be researching ways in which we can expand our strategic workforce and harness the cutting-edge thinking Silicon Valley can bring to strengthening our patent system. But if there’s anything you take away from our conversation, please recognize that the end of these efforts is not just to manage innovation for innovation’s sake. Instead, by cultivating technologies, by respecting them and protecting them, we can give ideas the vehicles they need to spread across continents and societies. All parts of the US innovation value chain must remain vibrant. And if amplified by good government policy, the current re-aligning trends can support one another to preserve American excellence in out-building, out-innovating and out-hustling our economic competitors.

**Absent plan leadership collapses**

Tran 12 President and Fellows of Harvard College, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 2012, 36 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 12, EXPEDITING INNOVATION, Sarah Tran, Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law, Lexis

Over one hundred years ago, technological innovation helped the United States rise to dominate the global economy, a position it has maintained since that time. n1 Technological advances by other nations now threaten to oust the United States from its privileged position. n2 Because market forces have produced a sub-optimal level of innovation and com-mercialization of key technologies in the United States, additional incentives are necessary to narrow the gap between the private incentives to research and develop these technologies and their social benefits. n3 With this nation's economic leadership position at risk of slipping, n4 the issue of what measures public entities can take to promote the innovation and commercialization of those technologies that are essential to American competitiveness is increasingly important.¶ Urgent times can justify urgent measures. n5 In an emergency room at a hospital, a patient who has had a heart at-tack and has but minutes to live will receive medical attention before a patient who has a less time-sensitive need for care. Such preferential treatment is justified, even though the treatment of all other patients may be delayed, by the ur-gent nature of a heart attack. In recognition of the urgency for technological progress in certain areas, the emergency room model permeates countless areas of the law where regulators have institutionalized deviations from their proce-dures to prioritize the [\*125] development of technologies of national importance. n6 The U.S. Food and Drug Admin-istration, for instance, has expedited its review process for drugs that treat serious diseases for almost two decades. n7¶ The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO" or "Patent Office"), an agency charged with examining patent appli-cations and issuing patents for new inventions, n8 is well poised to create additional incentives for the innovation and commercialization of socially valuable technologies by prioritizing these key technologies in its review process. n9 Yet surprisingly, it has not subscribed to the emergency room model. n10 Rather, patent examiners at the PTO generally re-view new patent applications in the order of their U.S. filing date. n11 The PTO adheres to this system despite the fact that it has a backlog of patent applications that requires inventors to wait almost three years on average to receive a pa-tent. n12 These delays in the patent review process make it difficult for inventors to obtain early financing for their inven-tions and render patent rights uncertain while the applications are pending. For technologies that are critically needed to further national interests, such as those relating to "biomedical research, information technology, and ... clean energy," n13 the backlog can cause substantial harm to public interests. n14 For instance, in the clean energy context the backlog has delayed the review process for patent applications pertaining to the ten-watt Philips Electronic LED light bulb, a light bulb that emits the equivalent of a sixty-watt light bulb and lasts twenty-five times as long; the smart thermostat, which reduces residential consumption of energy by telling homeowners [\*126] how much energy their homes are using and at what cost; Dow Chemical's Solar Shingle, a roof shingle that also functions as a solar panel; Enertia Building Sys-tem's method of building homes and offices without using fuel or electricity; thin film batteries that more efficiently power electronic devices; and the EPA's hydraulic hybrid power-train system, which has reduced the pollution and in-creased the efficiency of mail delivery trucks. n15 By lessening the value of the rewards of innovation for these key tech-nologies to both individual inventors and the public, the backlog also disrupts the constitutional patent bargain support-ing the very existence of the patent system: the grant of a patent to an inventor in exchange for the benefit to society of the promotion of "the Progress of Science and useful Arts." n16 Commentators have suggested a range of proposals to combat the backlog problem. n17 Yet insignificant analytical attention has been directed to the PTO's systemic failure to expedite the processing of socially valuable applications, which are most likely to help satisfy national priorities if pa-tented more quickly. n18¶ The PTO itself has acknowledged that extenuating circumstances justify the accelerated review of certain catego-ries of patents with greater social [\*127] potential but has done little to expedite the review of such applications. For example, the PTO recently initiated the Green Technology Pilot Program, a program that purports to accelerate the processing of applications on environmentally beneficial inventions, and has suggested that it may expand this program to expedite the review of other inventions of great social value. n19 However, unlike the PTO's sister patent offices abroad that are also prioritizing green technologies, n20 the PTO has (counterintuitively) limited eligibility in the Green Technology Pilot Program to technologies that have already been invented, while providing only nominal benefits to inventors who avail themselves of the program. n21 As a result, the Green Technology Pilot Program has been notably undersubscribed and ineffective as a catalyst for the innovation of much-needed green technology. n22 In essence, the PTO's program looks "green" without actually being "green." My thesis is that the PTO should reduce the obstacles that prevent applications involving beneficial green technologies from being expedited and select more categories of high-priority technologies for accelerated review. My proposal gains momentum from recent legislative reform. On Septem-ber 8, 2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act, which stipulates that the PTO may prioritize the examination of applications of importance to the national economy or national competitiveness. n23 By reviewing more types of patent applications [\*128] at a rate proportional to their social values, the PTO could fulfill this congressional directive while responding to critical public needs. n24¶ At first glance, my proposal conflicts with popular conceptions of fairness, which presume that individual inventors or investors should pay a fee or do a portion of the Patent Office's work as a quid pro quo for receiving fast-tracked re-view. n25 Requiring such a quid pro quo makes sense when all applications receive the same opportunities for expedited review. But when select categories of inventions are expedited on the basis of their ability to satisfy national priorities, the quid pro quo upsets the balance of the constitutional patent bargain by over-burdening the parties most likely to promote "the Progress of Science and useful Arts" n26 and by ignoring the availability of mechanisms to accommodate applicants who experience delayed processing periods. Thus, concerns about unfairness effectively dematerialize when the focus is on socially valuable technologies.

**Plan serves as a model**

Sarah Tran 12 is Assistant Professor of Law @ Southern Methodist University School of Law, “EXPEDITING INNOVATION”, 2012, 36 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 123, Accessed Date: 3-16-13 y2k

Although the PTO currently fails to meaningfully prioritize socially valuable patents, the constitutional purposes under-lying the existence of the patent system support reform of this deficiency. The heart of the patent system is an exchange of a benefit to the public, the promotion of "the Progress of Science and useful Arts," in return for an inventor's ability to hold the exclusive rights to an invention for a limited time. n141 Not every grant of a patent benefits society, however. The PTO does not discriminate against inventions that could be seen as detrimental to society (e.g., those enhancing tobacco production or pornographic products) or of little worth (e.g., those with little to no likelihood of commercial success). n142 At the other end of the [\*148] spectrum are inventions that are urgently needed to enhance the quality of life for millions of U.S. citizens, improve America's competitiveness before it falls too far behind other nations, and save lives. Unfortunately, the private incentives to develop these technologies are often inadequate, considering the benefits that society would receive from their use. Given the discrepancy in the importance of different inventions to society, providing preferential treatment to those inventions most likely to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts" should be the PTO's highest priority. By using the Green Technology Pilot Program as a model for broader permanent programs that target high-priority technologies, while also recognizing the shortcomings of this pro-gram, the PTO can help the United States surge forward and better optimize the fundamental patent bargain. n143 The gap between private incentives to develop green technologies and the social benefits that arise from such tech-nologies justified action by the PTO to expedite the processing of green patent applications. But the PTO's approach in the Green Technology Pilot Program has been far from ideal. By providing only nominal benefits to applicants who spend considerable resources to petition for special status under the program, the PTO has effectively paid lip service to environmental goals while doing little to aid the needy green industry. Even more worrisome, by restricting program eligibility to already-invented technologies, n144 the PTO has neglected one of its most basic regulatory purposes: fueling the innovation of new socially valuable technologies. These fundamental problems with the pilot program must be recti-fied before it can serve as a constructive model for broader programs that expedite the review of applications for other high-priority technologies. Concerns about the impropriety of allowing the PTO to define what constitutes a socially valuable technology and about fairness, however, can largely be overcome in light of the purposes of the patent system and the existence of mechanisms that ameliorate these concerns.

### 1AC---Solvency

**GTPP facilitates commercialization**

Nuebring 11 Our Generation's Sputnik Moment: Comparing the United States' Green Technology Pilot Program to Green Patent Programs Abroad, Summer 2011, Kate Nuehring, Northwestern University, School of Law, Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, 9 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 609, Lexis

The Green Technology Pilot Program offers a number of advantages both for society as a whole and for compa-nies and inventors that have qualifying pending patent applications. Facially, the program offers inventors and compa-nies the opportunity to have their application pendency reduced and offers society the benefit of having environmentally friendly technologies hurried along so that they may be available and utilized sooner.¶ Patent law provides major incentives for entrepreneurial activity. For chip design, software, pharmaceutical, bio-tech, and other tech companies, the value of the company's stock is based, at least in part, on the patents they own. n32 New companies in particular are more interested in obtaining patents. In 1972, entrepreneurs filed only 5% of patent applications; by 1992, entrepreneurs filed more than 23% of patent applications. n33 The reason is likely that, especially in the United States, venture capitalists who fund startup companies often want the certainty of patent protection as a precondition for [\*614] investment. n34 In many high technology areas, patents are the only assets small companies have and are crucial in attracting the venture capital necessary to commercialize their inventions. n35 Delays in getting a patent can be fatal for small companies because the lack of patent protection can seriously harm their ability to attract investors. n36¶ The Green Technology Pilot Program provides several major benefits to startup companies. First, startups that have their patent application accepted into the program are able to have the patent pendency reduced by, according to the estimations mentioned by the USPTO and a patent practitioner, anywhere from twelve to sixteen months. This re-duction in pendency potentially makes it easier to obtain venture capital at an earlier time than would otherwise be an-ticipated.¶ In addition, the name recognition of the program may provide a startup with an opportunity to more easily market itself as a legitimate green technology company. One of the first companies to receive a patent through the Green Technology Pilot Program, Skyline Solar, routinely mentions the Green Technology Pilot Program in its press re-leases. n37 Another company, EnergyOne Technologies, mentioned the program in a press release about its first provi-sional patent, openly stating that "[t]he patent filing is the first step for EnergyOne to establish itself in the renewable energy market as a forward thinking, leading edge technology powerhouse." n38¶ The Green Technology Pilot Program benefits American society as a whole by benefiting green entrepreneurs. The program encourages green technology entrepreneurs to produce clean energy products for the reasons described above, and Americans care about having clean energy technology for a number of reasons. Some Americans feel a mor-al obligation to be good stewards of the Earth and its resources and view global warming and environmental damage as a breach of this duty. n39 Other fiscally conscientious Americans worry about the impact of growing oil imports on the dollar. n40 Some Americans with a militaristic view consider the global conflict that could occur in the event of cata-strophic global warming. n41 Yet other Americans would prefer not to be [\*615] dependent upon oil imports from un-stable, if not outright hostile, countries in Latin America and the Middle East for foreign policy reasons. n42¶ In addition to alleviating these concerns, the Green Technology Pilot Program would potentially provide a boost to the economy by creating jobs in the newly developed green technology areas. A variety of studies have confirmed that technological effort has a strongly positive effect on net job creation. n43 Additionally, innovative companies gener-ally create more and destroy less employment than non-innovative companies. n44 All of this supports the idea that the Green Technology Pilot Program could have a net positive impact on the economy.

**Permanency and removing the cap solves**

Wong 12 Environmental Initiatives and the Role of the USPTO'S Green Technology Pilot Program, Sarah M. Wong, J.D. Candidate, 2012, Marquette University Law School. Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review, Winter, 2012, 16 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 233, Lexis

In its goals, the Green Technology Pilot Program seeks to encourage green innovations and "to help stimulate in-vestment in green technology, bring more green inventions to market, and create jobs," all in hope that accelerated pa-tent prosecution would allow inventors to secure funding, create businesses, and bring green technology to the market sooner. n91 As of November 7, 2011, roughly half of the 4588 petitions filed under the Program have resulted in exami-nation with special status; 2674 petitions have been approved and 325 are pending. n92 The increased speed of filing had accelerated the process to [\*250] forty-nine days for the first Office Action and issuance of a patent within twelve months of the filing date, as opposed to the usual thirty months to the first Office Action and forty months to a final decision. n93¶ As the USPTO modified and extended the Program over the past year, it has improved its original form by broaden-ing the classification system and opening up eligibility for incoming patents. However, the Program still falls short of a permanent solution.¶ 1. Increase the Incentive to Innovate¶ One of the key aspects of the Program is its utility as an incentive for innovation. The initial Program requirements granted accelerated status only to patents that had already been filed. n94 This requirement removed the incentive for fu-ture innovation. However, the recent expansion of the Program allows patent applications that have not yet been filed to participate in the Program. n95 Therefore, accelerated status can act as an incentive for future green technology innova-tion and investment. While this expansion is a step in the right direction, the USPTO should now make the Program permanent, thereby removing uncertainty relating to the Program's lifespan. Making the Program permanent allows it to act as an incentive for inventors and investors who have not yet contemplated patent protection.¶ 2. Increase Participation in the Program¶ ¶ Some speculate that participation in the Program has underperformed because the target audience of start-up companies has underutilized the Program. n96 One possible explanation for this shortcoming suggests that firms have not budgeted for the legal costs of patent protection at the accelerated pace. n97 Also, certain doctrines sway [\*251] companies from early patent filing because rushed disclosure does not allow the invention to be fully understood or tested. If inventions are patented too early, they may not receive adequate disclosure, and that inadequate disclosure may result in the patent being rejected under the utility, written description, or enablement requirements of the Patent Act. n98 Alternatively, early patenting before the invention has been fully understood would not give inventors the broadest patent protection possi-ble or the disclosure of the invention's most valuable claim potential. n99 Others speculate that larger companies may be less motivated to achieve accelerated status because they patent for defensive purposes. n100 While these fears remain with any accelerated process, broadening the eligibility of the Program would help to encourage the broadest possible participation. Thus, to encourage more people to participate, the 3000 patent cap must be lifted so that companies can anticipate guaranteed participation, the claim restrictions must be removed so that all eligible applications can partici-pate regardless of the number of claims, and the patent fee must be reduced so that companies have the financial ability to participate. n101 These improvements would broaden eligibility and encourage participation, thus patenting more green technology through the Program.¶ 3. Improve Acceleration Speed¶ ¶ Lastly, the Program aims to stimulate the economy by accelerating the timeframe in which key innovations can enter the marketplace and create capital. The Program is successful in removing the neutral nature of the patent process by making it favorable toward green technology. To keep up with the global competition, however, the U.S. needs to im-prove the acceleration rate further, so that companies are able to quickly commercialize and utilize the green technolo-gy. n102 Therefore, [\*252] the USPTO should continue to improve the rate at which green technology patents are being granted. n103¶ In conclusion, to maximize the incentivizing aspect of patent theory, the USPTO should make the Program perma-nent. To encourage participation in the Program, the USPTO should remove restrictions and broaden eligibility to the Program. Lastly, to compete with the global community and to facilitate commercialization of important green innova-tions, the USPTO must continue to improve its acceleration speed.

**Patent use inevitable- key to tech advancement**

Taylor 11 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Summer, 2011, 23 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 577, SCOTT TAYLOR, J.D. Candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, 2012; M.S. Tufts University, 2004, Lexis

There is substantial debate as to whether patents are a preferred, or even desired, policy instrument for encouraging innovation in the green context. n43 Notwithstanding its critics, conventional reasoning holds that robust patent protec-tion facilitates the progression of technological advancement by correcting for R&D market failures. n44 In short, the financial incentive to invent is preserved with a government-sanctioned market monopoly, while the price for that mo-nopoly, public disclosure, disseminates that knowledge to the public. n45 By requiring public disclosure, the idea is that others will create follow-on innovations, thereby leading to a more rapid technological advancement than in the absence of a patent system. n46 Like any other invention embodying an innovative and useful idea, green technologies are usually protected by intellectual property [\*584] rights ("IPRs") in the form of patents and utility models. n47¶ IPRs are complex instruments, capable of fostering innovation as well as hindering it. n48 But whether IPRs are an overall help or hindrance in the green technology context is essentially inapposite; the reality is that a robust intellectual property system is firmly entrenched in all developed nations, and will likely remain that way for the foreseeable future. n49 As the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement") and other bilateral free-trade agreements ("FTAs") containing intellectual property provisions take hold in developing and least-developed countries, worldwide intellectual property systems are approaching a level of harmoni-zation. n50 The result is that intellectual IPRs are strengthened globally. n51 Innovation and technology transfer proposals that aim to develop and disseminate green technology must thus work within the confines of a strong, i.e., protective, global intellectual property system.¶ The patenting of green technology, particularly clean energy, is currently concentrated in developed countries. n52 The United States and Europe are leaders in clean energy technologies, with China quickly advancing, particularly in the solar photovoltaic industry. n53 Several of these countries have implemented programs giving preferential treatment to patent applications that are deemed "green" or environmentally friendly. n54 For instance, the United States, United [\*585] Kingdom, China, Korea, Spain, and Australia have all recently instituted some form of expedited review proce-dure in their intellectual property offices for green-technology patent applications. n55 The European Patent Office ("EPO") is also taking steps towards elevating the status of green technology patent applications by developing a new classification system for clean-energy patents. n56¶ These national intellectual property office initiatives are geared towards increasing the frequency of disclosure of green technology as well as accelerating green innovation. n57 By reducing the application examination time, and hope-fully the associated monetary expense, traditional barriers to the patent process are mitigated, and green products can enter the marketplace sooner. n58 The Korean Patent Office purports to slash examination of a green patent to only one month, the shortest in the world. n59 In the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"), expedited examination is ex-pected to reduce the time it takes to grant a patent by an average of one year, a significant savings. n60 About 900 re-quests for expedited application review were filed in the United States approximately four months after the USPTO program was implemented, with about 300 requests granted. n61 The United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office also considers its program a success. n62 In the seven months after instituting its program, seventy-seven green patent appli-cations were filed, constituting one percent of all filed applications. n63 However, while early results at several patent offices with green initiatives appear [\*586] promising, one patenting authority reports that after six months, only four requests for accelerated processing were received. n64 Overall, it remains to be seen if these programs will lead to in-creased innovation and disclosure of green technologies. n65

**Carbon-based solar power is the best tech**

Mark Whittington 12 is Yahoo Contributor Network, “All Carbon Solar Cells Could Spark Long Delayed Solar Power Revolution,”

<http://voices.yahoo.com/all-carbon-solar-cells-could-spark-long-delayed-solar-11856559.html?cat=15>, Accessed Date: 3-17-13 y2k

According to a story in Futurity researchers at Stanford University have developed the first all carbon solar cell. This type of solar cell has a number of advantaged over more conventional solar cells but, thus far, one great drawback. A conventional solar cell consists of two electrodes and a photoactive layer that consists of conductive metals and indium tin oxide that absorbs sunlight and converts it to electricity. Most commercially available solar cells have an 11 percent to 15 percent efficiency. The drawback is that solar panels that one can put on one's roof tend to be prohibitively expensive. The Stanford scientists have managed to replace the expensive photoactive materials in a new, experimental solar cell with carbon, a low cost and abundant substance. They used grapheme, sheets of carbon one atom thick with carbon nanotubes 10,000 times narrower than a human hair. Besides the relative ease and cheapness of manufacture, all carbon solar cells can be coated on the walls and windows of building or even on cars to help generate electricity. Carbon solar cells can work better in extreme environments, high or low temperature, than conventional solar cells. The main drawback of the carbon solar cell is that it only converts infrared light and has about one percent efficiency. Researchers are confident, however, that they can greatly boost the efficiency of carbon solar cells over time. Even if the efficiency of all carbon solar cells never match that of conventional solar cells, their cheapness plus the ability it gives to make any exposed surface a solar collector may outweigh that disadvantage. Instead of deploying an array of solar panels on top of a building, spray on carbon solar cells could - in theory at least - make an entire building or residence a solar collector. A hybrid or electric car, parked under the sun, would gradually recharge its batteries without recourse to a recharging station. Spacecraft, instead of having to carry deployed solar panels, would absorb sunlight across its entire surface. Will carbon solar cells bring about the long sought but thus far long denied solar power revolution? Much depends on further research and what the marketplace decides. But there is now reason to at least be hopeful.

# 2AC

### Heg EXT

#### Perception of American strength prevents prolif and first strikes

Jim Talent 10 is distinguished fellow in government relations at the Heritage Foundation, Sowing the Wind, p. http://www.freedomsolutions.org/2010/03/sowing-the-wind-the-decay-of-american-power-and-its-consequences/

There is a reason that regimes like Iran and North Korea go to the time and expense, and assume the risks of developing nuclear weapons programs; nuclear capability empowers them to achieve their ends, and thereby poses challenges to the United States, for several reasons. First, there is a danger that rogue regimes with nuclear material may assist terrorists in developing weapons of mass destruction.[36] Even the possibility that such regimes may do so gives them leverage internationally. Second, these regimes have ambitions in their regions and around the world.[37] Some of their leaders are fanatical enough to actually consider a first strike using nuclear weapons; for example, high-ranking officials of the Iranian government have openly discussed using a nuclear weapon against Israel.[38] Whether a first strike occurs or not, the possession of nuclear capability frees aggressive regimes to pursue their other goals violently with less fear of retaliation. For example, North Korea’s nuclear capability means that it could attack South Korea conventionally with a measure of impunity; even if the attack failed, the United States and its allies would be less likely to remove the North Korean regime in retaliation. In other words, nuclear capability lessens the penalties which could be exacted on North Korea if it engages in aggression, which makes the aggression more likely. The same logic applies to Iran, which is why the other nations in the Middle East are so concerned about Iran’s nuclear program. A nuclear attack by Iran is possible, but the real danger of Iranian nuclear capability is that it would make conventional aggression in the region more likely.[39] Finally, the more nations that get nuclear weapons, the greater the pressure on other nations to acquire them as a deterrent, and this is particularly true when a government acquiring the capability is seen as unstable or aggressive. North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons has tended, for obvious reasons, to make the South Koreans and Japanese uncomfortable about having no deterrent themselves. The possibility of uncontrolled proliferation—what experts call a “nuclear cascade”[40]—is tremendously dangerous; it increases the possibility that terrorists can get nuclear material from a national program, and it raises the prospect of a multilateral nuclear confrontation between nations.[41] Many of the smaller nuclear nations do not have well-established first strike doctrine or launch protocols; the chance of a nuclear exchange, accidental or intentional, increases geometrically when a confrontation is multilateral. The antidote to proliferation is American leadership and power. The reality and perception of American strength not only deters aggressive regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; it reassures other countries that they can exist safely under the umbrella of American power without having to develop their own deterrent capability.

### A2: Macdonald and Parent

#### MacDanold article is bad scholarship—doesn’t account for a variety of factors

Grunstein 11 Judah Grunstein, World Politics Review's editor-in-chief, Appeared on World Politics Review, the American Prospect online, French Politics, the Small Wars Journal and Foreign Policy online, “Hegemony vs. Restraint in the Debate Over U.S. Defense Cuts”, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/10626/hegemony-vs-restraint-in-the-debate-over-u-s-defense-cuts>, 11/10/2011

If there's a weakness to both articles, it's that their arguments depend largely on best-case scenarios of outcomes that remain uncertain. As such, the retrenchment they call for represents significant risk to both U.S. interests and the global order, risk that the authors address by assuming it won't materialize. This is especially true for Parent and MacDonald. For instance, they argue that none of our allies in Asia or Europe face territorial threats, certainly true in the sense that total wars of territorial conquest are unimaginable, although Taiwan could be reasonably considered an exception to this rule. Nonetheless, it's safe to assume that China has no desire to occupy Japan or South Korea, and that even if it did, both have sufficient capabilities to deter such an intention. The same holds true for Europe vis à vis Russia. However, the authors don't address the far more relevant threat of "nibbling at the edges" of disputed borders, as in the South China Sea, the Caucasus and even along the China-India border. Nor do they take into serious enough consideration the question of intimidation, because for them, reducing America's forward base structure in East Asia will not mean a reduced U.S. commitment to its regional allies. As a result, it will have no impact on either assuring our friends or on deterring potential rivals. Perhaps, but perhaps not. A U.S. presence means U.S. skin in the game in the event of even an initial outbreak of hostilities. That has a far more visible and concrete impact in terms of assurance and deterrence than the promise of a U.S. riposte to any aggression. Offshore balancing certainly offers the U.S. more strategic flexibility than forward bases, but that very flexibility can create doubt in the minds of both allies and adversaries -- let alone friends that are not allies, such as India, that we are hoping to integrate into a regional security architecture. Parent and MacDonald also assume that a U.S. retrenchment will be orderly, and that any vacuum it creates will be filled by benign powers looking to reinforce and not contest the existing arrangement. Again, perhaps, but perhaps not. It's easy, for both supporters and critics alike, to talk in the abstract about the U.S. global role, while glossing over the concrete and massive nature of that role. As this eye-opening congressional testimony by Vice Adm. Bruce W. Clingan, via Raymond Pritchett, on "a day in the life" of the U.S. Navy shows, the U.S. really is everywhere and in a way that no other power has shown the willingness, let alone the ability, to replace even on a regional scale. When it comes to the U.S. role, there's certainly a lot, and given the financial burdens of this role, there's even too much. But it's hard to say exactly where the fat is. Something's got to give. But does it have to give as abruptly and as drastically as the restraint lobby, of which I also consider myself a member, is now advocating for? It's easy to call out various defense programs, cite their cost overruns and condemn them to the chopping block. But when you have a sense of where each one fits into the intricate scheme of the U.S. -- that is, the global -- security architecture, it's hard to hold back a wince. Finally, many if not all of the supporters of restraint base their argument on a reductionist vision of U.S. interests. But the U.S. simply cannot calculate its national interest as if it were just another nation -- it has assumed too prominent a global role. The reasons for that role were rarely altruistic, but they do create a responsibility to take into consideration our impact on the rest of the world. That means we must deleverage our global security position in the same manner that we deleverage our financial position -- gradually, orderly and responsibly. That might make the process more dangerous for the U.S., but it will most safely salvage the global stability we have for perhaps too long underwritten.

### A2: Smooth Decline

#### Tech leadership solves terror---contains terrorist threats and dissolves motivations for attack---only a risk that tech leadership prevents future attacks.

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Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. Security,” International Security 29.1 (2004) 122-151, Project MUSE, Accessed date: 11-8-12 y2k

The September 2001 terrorist attacks and their aftermath highlight several new risks in this regard. The attacks are a vivid reminder that science-based dominance on the conventional battlefield does not protect against unconventional attacks on soft nonbattlefield targets, using fuel-laden hijacked airliners, weaponized anthrax spores, dirty bombs, or worse. As U.S. conventional weapons supremacy grows, those who resent and resist U.S. power may be driven to employ increasingly asymmetric attack responses against ever-softer targets, including homeland targets. There is no way to completely eliminate this asymmetric challenge, but there are ways to contain it. First, this threat can be addressed through science itself. In 2002 the National Science Foundation initiated a series of new grants designed specifically to counter asymmetric terror threats by supporting breakthroughs in areas such as cybersecurity and the detection and decontamination of biological or chemical warfare agents. The new U.S. Department of Homeland Security is investing more than $1 billion a year in R&D. Such efforts can and should be expanded, as is noted below. Policy judgment and restraint are the second key to containing asymmetric threats. Science-based dominance has made the use of conventional force much easier for U.S. officials to contemplate, which brings a danger of more frequent and more careless use of force in circumstances where the conventional military results may be positive, but the political results negative.72 If a conventional military "victory" creates new and determined political enemies, one unintended consequence can be an increase in asymmetric threats, either to deployed U.S. forces (as in Iraq), or U.S. citizens and commercial assets abroad, or even to the homeland. More frequent and more aggressive U.S. military actions might also speed the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities among states hoping to deter U.S. conventional might. To contain the growthof asymmetric threats, it thus becomes essential to make sound judgments [End Page 145] about the most likely political reactions of conventionally defeated or threatened adversaries. Williamson Murray and Robert Scales argue that the United States needs to make larger investments in political and cultural knowledge, not just scientific knowledge, if it is to wage conventional wars with success.73 Knowing when an exercise of U.S. conventional military dominance will be resented and resisted becomes essential to minimizing a proliferation of asymmetric threats. This calls for more political science, not just more rocket science. That said, the threat of asymmetric responses would not be any less if the United States were to decide to invest less in science. Thomas Homer-Dixon has argued that scientifically sophisticated systems and societies somehow present softer and more inviting targets to terrorist groups.74 This argument is belied, so far, by the actual target choices made by the terrorists themselves: low-technology targets in low-technology societies (embassies or hotels in Africa), or middle-technology targets in low-technology societies (commercial aircraft operating in Africa and U.S. naval ships at anchor in Arabian ports), or at most middle-technology targets in high-technology societies (commercial and government buildings in the United States or commuter trains in Spain). High-technology targets in high-technology societies are apparently not that inviting, even to relatively sophisticated middle-technology terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida. Even in the face of asymmetric threats, more science usually means more security.

#### -- No attacks – terrorists are weak

Mueller 9 (John, Professor of Political Science – Ohio State University and Contributor – Foreign Affairs, “How Dangerous Are the Taliban?”, Foreign Affairs, April / May, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64932/john-mueller/how-dangerous-are-the-taliban)

In addition, al Qaeda has yet to establish a significant presence in the United States. In 2002, U.S. intelligence reports asserted that the number of trained al Qaeda operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000, and FBI Director Robert Mueller assured a Senate committee that al Qaeda had "developed a support infrastructure" in the country and achieved both "the ability and the intent to inflict significant casualties in the U.S. with little warning." However, after years of well funded sleuthing, the FBI and other investigative agencies have been unable to uncover a single true al Qaeda sleeper cell or operative within the country. Mueller's rallying cry has now been reduced to a comparatively bland formulation: "We believe al Qaeda is still seeking to infiltrate operatives into the U.S. from overseas." Even that may not be true. Since 9/11, some two million foreigners have been admitted to the United States legally and many others, of course, have entered illegally. Even if border security has been so effective that 90 percent of al Qaeda’s operatives have been turned away or deterred from entering the United States, some should have made it in -- and some of those, it seems reasonable to suggest, would have been picked up by law enforcement by now. The lack of attacks inside the United States combined with the inability of the FBI to find any potential attackers suggests that the terrorists are either not trying very hard or are far less clever and capable than usually depicted. Policymakers and the public at large should keep in mind the words of Glenn Carle, a 23 year veteran of the CIA who served as deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats: "We must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are." Al Qaeda "has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing and leading a terrorist operation," Carle notes, and "its capabilities are far inferior to its desires."

#### It’s try or die – hegemony is the only way to solve global problems like disease and war – it is effective EVEN IF countries backlash

**Gray, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2009**

(Colin, “AFTER IRAQ: THE SEARCH FOR A SUSTAINABLE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY”, 8-11, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB902.pdf>.

1. “Hegemony-light” is a policy, not a strategy. The main reason why the United States should endeavor to remain the hegemon is the need to play the dominant role in the endless struggle to support and advance a world order broadly conducive to America’s vital interests and friendly to American values, insofar as that proves feasible. In common with the slippery concept of security, order has many dimensions, including the political, the financial-economic, the environmental-ecological, and the military-strategic. In addition, world and regional order can be upset by the consequences of health crises (HIV-AIDS, most obviously), as the Spanish Flu pandemic of 191819 demonstrated.104 Also, adverse climate change, uncontrolled population growth in developing countries, and increasing resource shortages—of water, food, and energy—can and most probably will incite disorder in all major dimensions of global affairs. The United States will not be equally dominant in all aspects of global order, but its policy, strategy, and actual behavior will be either regnant or at least a major player in each of those dimensions. This is what it means to be hegemonic. The world needs leadership from some sufficient source. Although U.S. policy on global issues is often resisted, sometimes effectively, Americans nonetheless are able to help shape the global agenda and generally can exercise a potent influence on the world community’s actions. Washington frequently is annoyed and frustrated by the unwillingness of others to be led by U.S. policy choices. But Americans would be far more frustrated were they either to seek to abandon the hegemonic leadership role altogether, or to resign themselves to functioning within the straitjacket of near unanimous multilateral consent. Not much would be attempted, let alone achieved, on behalf of regional and global order. American hegemonic leadership does not mean American domination. America may be dominant, indeed it will need to be dominant in its ability to persuade, bribe, and, if necessary, coerce. But it cannot guard global order by a policy of domination.

## Off

### 2AC T

#### 1. We meet---

#### A) Economic transfer can be material rewards.

12 Manage 6 is management portal which contains over 400 methods and theories along with more than 1500 management terms, “Incentives,” 3-9, <http://www.12manage.com/description_incentives.html>, Accessed Date: 3-22-13 y2k

Definition Incentives. Description. An Incentive is any extrinsic reward factor that motivates an employee or manager or team to achieve an important business goal on top of his/her/their intrinsic motivation. It is a factor aiming to shape or direct behavior. In an optimal form, executives and employees should be remunerated well (but cost-effectively) where they deserve it, and not where they do not. Pay-offs for failure should be kept to a minimum. Furthermore, to be effective, a layered or gradual approach is better than an all-or-nothing incentive. A smart executive reward scheme is one of the pillars to ensure entrepreneurial behavior and maximizing shareholder value (Compare: Value Based Management). An incentive is unlike coercion, in that coerced work is motivated by the threat or use of violence, punishment or negative action, while an incentive is a positive stimulation. Incentives can also be used as Anti Hostile Takeover Mechanisms. categories of incentives. Classes Financial Incentive. Also called, Remunerative Incentive, this category involves offering a material reward (often in the form of money) in exchange for certain results or behavior. In business, this is the most important category. The many variants include: Profit sharing (the traditional, oldest approach). Merit pay (merit wage or salary increase, often depending on the results of an appraisal). Scientific Management (Taylor) and Piece-Rate systems (very effective on productivity, but may lead to quality issues). Pay for Performance or Gain Sharing.

#### B) Patent are material rewards.

Kaplan 2010

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The purpose of patents is to provide the requisite incentive for inventors whose creations will "advance a public good." n45 However, patent law recognizes that "inventions are public goods that are costly to make and that are difficult to control once they are released into the world." n46 In order to strike a balance between these ends, patent law relies upon economic principles that provide tangible financial incentives to promote the creation of novel [\*1002] products. For example, patent law provides economic incentives for inventors and scientists to invest time and energy in creating new inventions. n47 Specifically, "patents provide incentives to individuals by offering them recognition for their creativity and material reward for their marketable inventions. These incentives encourage innovation," n48 which in turn serves the public good by making these discoveries available to society. n49 It is believed that society would not benefit without patents because inventors would otherwise lack the necessary "incentive to invest in creating, developing, and marketing new products." n50 This phenomenon is equally relevant to the pharmaceutical industry, n51 which develops vaccines. In order to encourage pharmaceutical companies to innovate, patent law provides the necessary economic motivation for these inventors "by allowing [them] to appropriate the full economic rewards of [their] inventions." n52 Thus, the pharmaceutical companies are likely to invest both time and money into scientific research in exchange for the economic rewards that are greatly enhanced by the patent exclusivity rights. n53 These economic incentives are especially pronounced with regard to patenting influenza vaccines because each vaccine is only effective against a certain strain of a disease. n54 Although a [\*1003] scientist who is researching a vaccine will devote time to this research just like any other inventor, the time that a scientific researcher devotes to the creation of a flu vaccine will likely only be profitable for one flu season, n55 which generally translates into the winter months of a calendar year. n56 Moreover, the costs of creating the vaccine include not only research and development, but also the costs of production, regulation, and clinical trials. n57 Due to the shortened time frame during which developers of influenza vaccines may recoup their large investments, the creators of vaccines have an even greater "interest in being rewarded for their effort, typically by being able to recoup financial investments in research and development and profit from their inventions." n58

#### 2. We meet---plan lifts restriction

Sarah M. Wong 12 is J.D. Candidate, 2012, Marquette University Law School, “Environmental Initiatives and the Role of the USPTO'S Green Technology Pilot Program,” Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review, Winter, 2012, 16 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 233, Lexis

Despite these setbacks and participation well short of 3000 patents, on November 10, 2010, the USPTO announced that it was extending the Green Technology Pilot Program until December 31, 2011. n79 The USPTO also expanded eligibility for the Program to include applications that had been filed on or after December 8, 2009. n80 This expansion now allows petitions seeking accelerated status to be filed simultaneously with patent applications. Yet, just as before, if fewer than 3000 grantable petitions are received, the Program is said to end on December 31, 2011. n81¶ VII. The Future of Green Technology and Patent Protection¶ For patent protection of green technology, reduced incentive and greater hindrance to dissemination remain its greatest challenge. However, an improvement in the speed of patenting would help to facilitate dissemination. So far, Program participation has been underwhelming. Reenergizing the Program will call for focusing on three goals: (1) increasing the incentive to innovate, (2) increasing participation in the Program, and (3) improving acceleration. Thus, achieving these goals will demand making the Program permanent, lifting restrictions to the Program, and continuing to improve the acceleration speed.

#### 3. Counter-interpretation: Financial incentives are R&D-based incentives that include patents---we will provide you with the case-list.

James Love 0 is the Director of Knowledge Ecology International, “Paying for health care R&D: Carrots and Sticks,” <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/rnd/carrotsnsticks.html>, October 18, 2000, Accessed Date: 3-23-13 y2k

The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA) and its member organizations are frequent proponents of various government subsidies, tax breaks or other financial incentives that are designed to increase private R&D. Among the typical set of incentives are: Tax credits on R&D. In the United States, pharmaceutical companies are eligible to a tax credit for increasing R&D, and for half the costs of expenditures on clinical trials for orphan indications, defined, in the US, for example, as a use for a drug that has a potential US client population of less than 200,000. There are also various proposals for tax credits on vaccine research. Tax credits lower the private cost of doing the R&D, thereby increasing the private returns. Among the criticisms of a general tax credit are that this does not do enough to change the composition of R&D. Targeted credits, like the US Orphan Drug tax credit, are somewhat better at this, but less so than public grants programs. Credits are also criticized on the grounds that the amount of public subsidy to a company or for a particular research endeavor is not transparent -- there is no public information on who gets the credits or what the credits are used for. And also very important, the government does not retain any rights in the research. There is also no "needs test" for these subsidies, and credits are given even when the credit does not influence investment decisions.(5) Extensions of exclusive rights as a reward for R&D. The pharmaceutical industry has proposed in a variety ways that governments reward R&D with extensions of exclusive rights. As a reward for pediatric studies on drugs. Under Section 505A of the FDA Act, "If . . . the Secretary determines that information relating to the use of a new drug in the pediatric population may produce health benefits in that population, the Secretary makes a written request for pediatric studies . . and such studies are completed within any such timeframe," the FDA extends the Orange Book patent exclusivity, Hatch/Waxman data exclusivity and orphan drug marketing exclusivity by six months. Under this program, a company can file even a useless study, and trigger a two month extension of exclusivty, because that is the period to review the application. If the study is accepted as having value, the firm gets the entire six month extention of exclusivity, even when the study was small, and the economic value of the exlusivity extention is large. Extensions of marketing exclusivity can be worth a lot to the drug companies. AstraZeneca is reportedly seeking a six month extension for its Losec product, which generates more than $16 million per day worldwide. Prices for Losec in the US market are $3.52 per pill, while generic copies of the drug sell for as low as $.07 to $.17 per pill in some markets. The costs of a pediatric clinical trial may be relatively small. According to a recent CPT survey, the typical cost of outsourcing clinical trials for pharmaceutical drugs are in the range of $2,000 to $7,000 per patient, numbers which are consistent with data from the National Cancer Institute (NCI). At $5,000 per patient, a trial involving 500 patients would cost $2.5 million, or less than 4 hours of Losec sales.(6) The US program for pediatric studies would make more sense if the Secretary could negotiate the term of the extension, up to the maximum of six months, and also require disclosures of the costs of the additional studies, in order to facilitate a cost benefit analysis of the program, and to provide some measure of the relative advantages of the government funding its own studies. Transferable patent extensions as a reward for R&D on neglected diseases. This proposal is a current favorite of the major pharmaceutical companies. As the Losec example above illustrates, companies can protect huge profits by extending, even for a few months, patents on blockbuster drugs. The industry has proposed the award of transferable patent extensions for up to three years, in return for carrying out various R&D programs -- for example, for development of a new drug for tuberculosis. Again, the criticism of patent extensions are that they are expensive, in terms of higher prices, and undoubtably wasteful, from an economic point of view. What would make a program like this more interesting would be some type of market mechanisms to get the maximum public health benefits for the minimum cost to the public. Alternative approaches might involve bidding or negotiations on a variable that was linked to the extension of exclusivity. For example, such mechanisms might include bidding for: The shortest period of exclusivity, in return for a specified R&D outcome, The least amount of money in sales, before the exclusivity expired, or The most amount of money invested in qualified R&D projects. There is also the issue of the intellectual property rights from the R&D. Under a program of grants or contracts, governments can negotiate or mandate a share of the intellectual property rights in the R&D, or set public interest conditions on issues such as pricing or access, as was done recently, for example, in South Africa for an AIDS vaccine research project.(7) If the public is in fact paying for the R&D, indeed, paying several times over for the R&D, it is reasonable to ask that the public obtain rights in the research that they have already paid for. Purchase funds. Jeffrey Sachs and others have suggested governments and donors endow huge funds to guarantee purchases of new medicines, solving the lack of purchasing ability market failure. The practical difficulties in such approaches are many, including, for example, determining the criteria for products that could be bought from the pool, or dealing with perverse incentives regarding the timing of product development. A more general problem is that the donors, government or private, deal with the inventions after intellectual property rights are in hand. By not directly funding the pre discovery R&D, there are no mechanisms to assert property rights, post invention. For this reason the purchase fund approach is an extremely expensive way to buy R&D. Prizes. A variation on the purchase fund approach is to create "prize" funds for R&D. Under this type of approach one could imagine using the prize fund to purchase intellectual property rights, to deal with post discovery access issues. However, like the purchase fund approach, it can be an expensive proposition when the fund is dealing with post discovery rights. Orphan Drug market exclusivity. The US and EU orphan drug programs both provide grants of market exclusivity to enhance R&D investments in neglected diseases. When the US Orphan Drug Act (ODA) was first proposed, there were no provisions for marketing exclusivity, and indeed the problem was perceived to be that the markets were so unprofitable that market-exclusivity was a non-issue. Why would exclusivity be important for a market that no one wanted in the first place? However, pharmaceutical company lobbyists successfully made a grant of market exclusivity one of the core features of the US program. Under the US program, the marketing exclusivity applies to both new and old drugs, and gives a firm exclusivity for any indication for which the there are fewer than 200,000 US patients. The US government can grant marketing exclusivity for one indication, such as the BMS version of Taxol for ovarian cancer, and then later approve the same drug for an indication such as breast cancer, where the client population is large, and not subject to marketing exclusivity, and then again for Kaposi's sarcoma, where the client population qualifies for the orphan designation. The ODA market exclusivity can be broader than the rights granted under a patent, and in some cases will block the introduction of products that are protected under different patents(8). Companies frequently use the ODA marketing exclusivity provisions as a weapon against entry by generic products, for example, as BMS did in the case of the IVAX application to market generic paclitaxel for Kaposi's sarcoma. In this case, BMS and IVAX both applied for ODA marketing exclusivity, but BMS beat the IVAX application by just six days. Oxandrolone The costs of orphan drug exclusivity to consumers can be very high. For example, Oxandrolone is an anti-wasting drug that had been on the market for decades, with a generic price of $.30 per pill. Bio-Technology General (BTG) received an orphan drug designation for the product in 1995, for use in treating wasting of AIDS patients, an old use for a new illness, qualifying as a new indication, and raised the price to $3.75 per pill. The cost of the drug at the higher prices was estimated to be $5,475 to $43,800 per year in one analysis.(9) BTG responding to criticisms of the higher price by capping the price at $15,000 per year for any patient, but the use of the medicine was greatly reduced by the higher price. Given the high cost to consumers of marketing exclusivity, one has to ask about the value of this approach, in terms of incentives for R&D, particularly when the drugs are also eligible for patents and data exclusivity. Investors receive 20 years of exclusive rights under patents when there is an invention, and 5 to 10 years of data exclusivity in the US and Europe, when they invest in data needed for registration of new drugs. The ODA marketing exclusivity is most important when: The company cannot claim a patentable invention, and Does not own the rights to the data used for registration of a new product. The ODA basically rewards companies that have done very little. Supporters of the ODA say it rewards investors for investments in research associated with new uses of an older drug, or for the start-up costs of marketing a product, but it is important to appreciate the limits of the companies contributions when the drug is not new, and when the company cannot claim a patentable invention. A review of the early history of the orphan drug act illustrates the paucity of the new private sector investments in clinical research for orphan drugs. From 1983 to 1993, the total amount claimed under the orphan drug tax credit was $107 million. This represents half of the cost of claimed expenses for human use clinical trials for orphan drugs, or $213 million before the credit. During this period the US FDA gave marketing approval to 93 orphan products, including blockbuster products that generated hundreds of millions in annual sales. The cost of the marketing exclusivity, in terms of higher prices to consumers, was several multiples of the $213 million in private investment in orphan drug clinical trials. For example, Amgen used its orphan drug marketing exclusivity to build a thicket of process and indication patents to bar future competitors for EPO, a drug that now generates more than $4 billion globally in annual sales. 1999 US orphan drug approvals In 1999, there were seven US orphan drug approvals. Of the seven, four have FDA orange book listings for patents, and three do not. None of the seven drugs are marketed by the inventors. The number of patients in clinical trials referenced in the drug approval ranged from 152 to 1,281, with an average of 588 patients. The prices for the orphan products are high, running as much as $72 thousand for temozolomide, a drug sold by Schering-Plough for the treatment of refractory anaplastic astrocytoma. Temozolomide was approved on the basis of a clinical trial involving only 162 patients. Even at $10 thousand per patient, which is 60 percent more than the average for the fy 1999 NIH DCP cancer trials(10), the cost would have been 1.6 million, half of which would have been offset by the US orphan tax credit. As flawed as the US ODA is, it has become the model for similar laws, pushed by the industry and some patient groups, in Singapore, Australia, Japan and the European Union. Data Exclusivity. The US, the EU and several other countries have a sui generis form of protection on data rights. The US law was part of a compromise in the 1984 Hatch/Waxman Act, which also included provisions for easier generic drug entry, and provides for five years of exclusivity for data used to support new drug approvals. The European Union has similar laws at the EU and country level, which provide 6 to 10 years of data exclusivity, the longer term originally designed to compensate for a lack of patent protection in Spain and Portugal. The pharmaceutical industry is seeking a harmonization of 10 years for all countries, and they are also trying to extend the rights to any registration data, including data on new indications of older drugs. The data exclusivity provisions are irrelevant in cases where there is a patentable invention, and it is also worth noting that for products with small client populations, there is strong marketing exclusivity now under US and EU orphan drug laws, so the protections are for non-inventions that serve large populations. Again, programs like this would make more sense if there was a clearer connection between the benefits to society and the company's investments. A starting point would be to routinely require public disclosure of the costs of data collection, and to link the protections to some measure of cost recovery (including opportunities for competitors to share costs) rather than providing a flat 5 to 10 year period of exclusivity.

#### Education---intangible assets are the heart of the topic, which ensures good neg ground about core market processes.

Dr Helena Barton 5 is Business Development Manager (USA) for CoreRatings, a unit within DNV Certification, “Leveraging intangible assets: how a rating can help measure and communicate performance,” September, 2005, <http://www.corporatecontext.com/leveraging_intangibleassets.pdf>, Accessed Date: 3-23-13 y2k

With a sturdy stride the elephant in the room is taking center stage. Intangible assets have in recent years become the focus of companies, financial analysts, investors, accountants and regulators alike in attempts to understand and narrow the gap between a company’s book and market value. For most companies, intangible assets today are a major value driver and account for more than tangible assets; research estimates that between 70% and 85% of all assets are intangible1 but they go largely unaccounted in financial statements. For example, the balance sheet assets of Coca-Cola or Microsoft account for less than 5% of their total value.2 Quantifying intangible assets has long presented a challenge for accountants and financial analysts. Different approaches compete on how to define, classify and incorporate these assets within mainstream accounting and valuation. As non-physical claims to future value or benefits, intangible assets include reputation, goodwill, brands, intellectual capital, organisational capacity for innovation, corporate culture, quality of management systems and the ability of management to navigate and compete in an increasingly complex business landscape. While a market for certain intangible assets, such as brand and goodwill, is created when a business changes hands, it is generally considered incomplete. So why the growing interest in intangibles and why now? As equity prices have increased beyond the intrinsic value of the underlying companies, the need to explain and justify these valuations has become more urgent for financial analysts. In other words, it has become important to differentiate between true long-term intangible value and short-term speculative investment. Understanding how intangible assets can create future value may arguably lie at the heart of the business case for corporate responsibility. Much of the activity and effect of integrating corporate responsibility principles into operations – and managing related risks – are mediated through intangible resources and processes

### 2AC Courts

#### Perm do both—no reason why both branches can’t do the plan—solves politics NB

Robert T. Garrett and Terrence Stutz 5 are Dallas Morning News Staff. August 19th ‘05

“Legislature adjourns special session Justices to decide if overhaul needed after bills fail in Legislature” accessed 8/27/10 at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/texassouthwest/legislature/stories/082005dntexsession.8bd31b4a.html

**A court finding against the state would put the ball back** in the hands of lawmakers, who have tended to put off dealing with problems in schools, prisons and mental health facilities until state or federal judges forced them to act. **"It's the classic political response to problems they don't want to deal with,"** said Maurice Dyson, a school finance expert and assistant law professor at Southern Methodist University. **"There is no better** political cover **than to have a court rule that something must be done, which allows politicians to say their hands are tied."**

#### Solves politics

Perine 8 (Katherine, Staff – CQ Politics, “Congress Unlikely to Try to Counter Supreme Court Detainee Ruling”, 6-12, http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000002896528&cpage=2)

Thursday’s decision, from a Supreme Court dominated by Republican appointees, gives Democrats further cover against GOP sniping. “This is something that the court has decided, and very often the court gives political cover to Congress,” said Ross K. Baker, a Rutgers Universitiy political science professor. “You can simply point to a Supreme Court decision and say, ‘The devil made me do it.’ ”

#### Courts won’t enforce—causes massive delay

Powers and Rothman 2—Stephen Powers is Research Associate for the Center for Social and Political Change at Smith College and Stanley Rothman is Professor of Government and Director of the Center for Social and Political Change at Smith College, “Least Dangerous? Consequences of Judicial Activism,” p179

A recurrent problem with the judiciary’s extension of fundamental rights to the institutions we have studied is that when courts intervene, they do not merely point out a constitutional or statutory violation that must be corrected. They typically dictate a detailed set of remedies to address the issue. This type of intervention has generated a notoriously rigid approach to institutional reform. The judiciary was not designed to legislate or to execute the laws, only to interpret their meaning. It lacks the accountability required of a policy-making body. Judges are only accountable to the public under the most rare and extreme circumstances. Yet in the wake of elaborate court orders, prisons, mental hospitals, schools, police departments, and corporations must all continue to balance individual rights against group or societal interests. Unfortunately, judges do not have the expertise, the time, or the inclination to make the kind of long-term incremental adjustments that may be critical to institutional stability and progress. That is why court-ordered remedies rarely work as planned and have so many unanticipated consequences. Moreover, as we have seen, modification or reversal of court rulings adversely impacting social and political institutions generally takes years.

#### Or enforcement kills court’s legitimacy---triggers court-stripping and turns enforcement.

Bentley, 2007 (Curt, Constrained by the liberal tradition, Brigham Young University Law Review, p. lexis)

This institutional limitation theory focuses primarily on the constraints imposed on the Court because of its relationship with the other branches of government. The Supreme Court is not wholly dependent upon other branches of government; the unique legitimacy given its interpretations of the Constitution by the American people provides it with real influence of its own. n116 However, the institutional limitation theory posits that since the Court possesses neither the purse nor the sword, n117 it relies upon its  [\*1745]  legitimacy in the eyes of the American people in order to pressure the legislative and executive branches to enforce its decrees: The Supreme Court ... possesses some bases of power of its own, the most important of which is the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of the Constitution. This legitimacy the Court jeopardizes if it **flagrantly opposes the major policies** of the dominant alliance; such a course of action, as we have seen, is one in which the Court will not normally be tempted to engage. n118 **Without legitimacy** in the eyes of the public, both Congress and the President might feel justified in **resisting the ruling of the Court** either through jurisdiction-stripping n119 or by simply refusing to enforce its decrees. n120 There is precedent **for both in American history**. n121 The Court risks becoming substantially weakened, or even irrelevant, when the political branches ignore judicial decrees and where it nonetheless doggedly pursues the counter-majoritarian course. n122

### 2AC Electricity $

#### It’s high

EIA 3/12 “SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK,” <http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/electricity.cfm>, Accessed Date: 3-24-13 y2k

Rising costs of infrastructure upgrades continue to drive increases in residential electricity rates, although lower fuel prices in recent years have kept growth in retail rates relatively modest. After an increase of 1.4 percent during 2012, EIA expects U.S. retail residential electricity prices will grow by 1.9 percent in 2013 and by 1.8 percent in 2014.

#### Natural gas supply will collapse

RP Siegel 2-22, PE, is an inventor, consultant and author, “Shale Energy Bubble Threatens Second Economic Collapse,” <http://www.triplepundit.com/2013/02/shale-gas-bubble-threatens-second-economic-collapse/> Accessed Date: 2-22-13 y2k

There has been more than a little celebration as the result of the huge shale gas deposits discovered in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. The discovery has led to a sense among many that our energy problems are not terribly urgent. Even President Obama referred to a 100 year supply of natural gas in his second State of the Union address. The U.S. is now predicted to become the world’s top oil and gas producer in the year 2017. What those predictions don’t tell is how long the U.S. is expected to remain in that position. According to one expert, that status could be very short-lived indeed. In fact, according to David Hughes, a scientist who spent 32 years with the Geological Survey of Canada, the exceedingly optimistic estimates could be setting us up for a fall, the likes of which we have not seen since the real estate collapse of 2008. Hughes is currently a fellow with the Post Carbon Institute. Shale gas has grown explosively to the point that it now supplies some 40 percent of U.S. natural gas. But the question is, how long can that explosion last? Hughes has noted in his report, Drill Baby Drill that it’s not the amount of gas in situ, but the achievable rate of supply that really matters. It turns out, there are significant constraints to achieving the needed rates for both shale gas and oil. After studying production data for some 65,000 shale gas wells, using the industry standard DI Desktop /HPDI database, Hughes found that the vast majority of these wells are depleted within five years. So although, there is a huge amount of gas and oil sitting there, it will become increasingly difficult, risky and expensive to retrieve those resources as time goes on. The very high rates of decline of these wells will require thousands of new wells to be dug at a cost that could well exceed the value of the energy extracted. In the case of shale gas, Hughes estimates a cost of $42 billion per year as compared to $32.5 billion worth of gas that was produced in 2012. A similar scenario exists with the shale (tight) oil, The two main plays in North Dakota (Bakken/yellow) and Texas (Eagle Ford/brown) are declining rapidly and will require over 1500 new wells annually at a cost of $14 billion, just to offset the declines. Production of this oil is expected to peak in 2017 (the year the US briefly becomes top producer) dropping back within two years to 2012 levels and essentially petering out by 2025. In other words, this whole shale oil bonanza will be a bubble of about ten years’ duration (see graph). Tar sands oil, the raison d’être for the much-opposed Keystone XL pipeline, is likewise troubled. It contains relatively low energy while requiring lots of energy, in the form of steam, to produce. Some estimates claim a cost of as much as $100 per barrel. It is not just Hughes saying this. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) sees U.S. domestic crude oil production including shale oil peaking at 7.5 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2019 (well below the all-time U.S. peak of 9.6 mbd in 1970), and by 2040 the share of domestically produced crude oil is projected to be lower than it is today. At the same time as Hughes’ report came out, Deborah Rogers of the Energy Policy Forum also issued her report, Shale and Wall Street: Was the Decline in Natural Gas Prices Orchestrated?. Rogers is a former investment banker, now the founder of the Energy Policy Forum. According to her report, shale mergers and acquisitions became one of the most profitable areas for Wall St. investment banks, accounting for some $46.5 billion worth of deals. Her report provides evidence that Wall Street promoted the natural gas drilling frenzy (much as it did the housing bubble), by, among other things, conspiring with energy companies to overstate the size of reserves by as much as 4-500% , as well as understating the steep decline rates and highly inefficient nature of these operations. Furthermore, they drove production to unsustainable levels in an effort to drive prices down to encourage investment and manipulate government policy in a direction most favorable to domestic oil and gas production. Because of the debt resulting from these highly leveraged operations, stated reserves may have broken SEC rules in an effort to avoid collateral default. So, it seems what we have here is a conspiracy of misinformation, on the part of energy companies and their Wall Street backers, intended, in the name of short term profit, to lure our economy out onto a branch of the energy tree that is not strong enough to hold its weight. When that branch collapses, prices will suddenly go through the roof, and the result will be much the same as the financial collapse of 2008, only this time the government will be asked to bail out the oil companies. I think it would be appropriate, given this information, to immediately terminate the Keystone XL pipeline and to initiate criminal prosecution of all those involved, for their attempt to defraud the American public, and to, once again put the entire world economy at risk. And, it’s time for this game to get some rules, so this doesn’t keep happening.

#### Turn---Solar power lowers the price of electricity

John Frarrell 12 directs the Energy Self-Reliant States and Communities program at ILSR and he focuses on energy policy developments that best expand the benefits of local ownership and dispersed generation of renewable energy. Farrell also authored the landmark report Energy Self-Reliant States, which serves as the definitive energy atlas for the United States, detailing the state-by-state renewable electricity generation potential. Farrell regularly provides discussion and analysis of distributed renewable energy policy on his blog, Energy Self-Reliant States (energyselfreliantstates.org), and articles are regularly syndicated on Grist and Renewable Energy World. “How Distributed Solar Power Can Lower Electricity Prices,” CleanTechnica, February 13, 2012, http://cleantechnica.com/2012/02/13/how-distributed-solar-can-reduce-electricity-prices/, Last Accessed 3/23/13) ELJ

What if installing more solar could reduce electricity prices? It’s already happening in Germany, world leader in solar power, and it’s likely to happen in the U.S., too. Right now, the idea of solar reducing electricity prices seems silly.  After all, when subsidies aren’t factored in, the cost of residential solar will be higher than residential retail electricity prices in all but 3 states until after 2016.  But solar has two key factors in its favor: 1.Electricity, like many things, costs more when in high demand.  And while many U.S. ratepayers on are flat rate electricity plans, the truth is that their utility pays more to deliver electricity on those hot, sunny afternoons in the summer when air conditioners are running like mad.  Utilities call these times “peak periods,” when electricity use spikes and they have to turn on every last power plant. 2.Solar PV arrays tend to produce at their best during these peak periods. The following chart shows how PG&E (a California utility) charges significantly more for electricity during the afternoon hours when demand is high, and how a south-facing, fixed-tilt solar array can produce a lot of electricity during those peak hours. Solar output can actually match this peak curve better, if the panels are angled toward the southwest rather than due south, resulting in more late afternoon output. Either way, however, solar adds electricity to the electricity system when it needs it most. And when that happens, it supplants electricity that was previously supplied by the dirtiest and most costly fossil fuel “peaking” power plants.

#### Link is self-correcting---higher price results in new power plants---stabilizes prices.

Dave Fehling 12 is the Houston-based broadcast reporter for StateImpact. Before joining StateImpact Texas, Dave reported and anchored at KHOU-TV in Houston. He also worked as a staff correspondent for CBS News from 1994-1998. He now lectures on journalism at the University of Houston. “ Not Enough: Even Higher Price for Electricity Urged for Texas,” StateImpact, July 17, 2012, http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/07/17/not-enough-even-higher-price-for-electricity-urged-for-texas/, Last Accessed 3/24/13) ELJ

According to some industry insiders, when the state-regulated peak price for wholesale electricity jumps 50% next month, it will fail to do what the Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) had hoped: encourage the construction of new power plants to avert shortages. “The prices have to go up before you see any significant generation being built,” said Dallas energy consultant John Bick, formerly with TXU Energy, now with Priority Power Management.The Critical Hours for Making Money Last month, the PUC approved raising the cap on the peak-demand price from $3,000 per megawatt hour to $4,500/MWh starting August 1. That’s not high enough? “Correct”, says Bick. How about $6,000, even $9,000? Would that have an effect? “I agree, yes,” says Bick. Also agreeing that a much higher peak price is needed is John Ragan, president of NRG’s Gulf Coast operations, the second biggest power generator in Texas (Dallas-based Luminant is number one). “You have to understand that electric generators in the market we have in Texas really earn their return on those very high-priced hours. And there’s only a couple hundred of those hours in any given year,” Ragan told StateImpact in an interview at NRG’s Houston office. “The rest of the time, the prices are $30, $20 (a megawatt hour), at night they go negative. So these hours are critical. But we do need to see a very high price for those hours to make economic sense for development of new generation,” said Ragan. He said they call that critical margin—usually earned during extreme weather— the “missing money” that would make it possible to invest in new power plants.

Power Down on the Bayou The last time NRG said it could justify a new plant wasn’t that long ago. In 2009, the company fired-up a new, natural gas-burning power plant called Cedar Bayou Unit 4, located near Galveston Bay in Chambers County. Medium-sized plants like it can cost a half billion dollars. “Our shareholders took the risk of that. We provided equity to build that plant. We did that when (natural) gas prices were much higher which meant power prices were much higher. And therefore, at the time, it made economic sense to do so.” NRG couldn’t do that today? “We could not do that today,” said Ragan. “It doesn’t make sense for us to make that kind of investment.” The PUC has indicated it’s willing to consider hiking the peak price to as high as $9,000/MWh. Though astudy done for the PUCfound that even at that price, development of new power plants would still fall short of the state’s goal for reserves to avoid blackouts. Raise the Price But Will They Build Some projectsare in the works. Panda Energy is planninga new gas-fired power plantin Temple that could provide electricity to 900,000 homes. While acknowledging the risks of the Texas wholesale power market, Standard and Poor’s—the credit rating company—said it expects Texas to have less and less reserves in the next five years, a good sign it said for the Panda project. “If this trend holds, there could be considerable support for higher prices, which in turn would likely promote development of new power plants,”S&P said in a report. But some critics have doubts that no matter the higher peak price, few new plants will get built. The Texas chapter of the Sierra Club has asserted that the only sure thing is that big energy companies will rake in far higher profits. The group’s “Beyond Coal” campaign advocates conservation and alternative energy. Advocates for electricity users, both residential and commercial, warn it’ll mean higher utility bills. The Texas Industrial Energy Consumers group said if the price cap were increased to $9,000/MWh, it would add $14 billion a year to Texas wholesale electricity costs which could translate into hundreds of dollars a year for residential customers. NRG’s John Ragan disagrees. “In general, industrial and residential customers will not be that impacted by what sounds like very high prices,” Ragan said.

### 2AC CIR DA

**Won’t pass**

**Palmer, Politico Staff Writer, 3-27**, 20**13**,

(Anna, "The Gang of Eight's spring break road trip", Politico, PAS) [www.politico.com/story/2013/03/immigration-talks-hit-the-border-not-ground-zero-89407.html](http://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/immigration-talks-hit-the-border-not-ground-zero-89407.html) 3-28-13

NOGALES, Ariz. — Overlooking a hillside dotted with big box stores, mobile homes and fast food chains just a few miles from Mexico, key Senate immigration reform negotiators gathered for a news conference to show they’ve found common ground on at least one issue — border security.¶ The only problem: disagreement on the border wasn’t the reason senators couldn’t come up with a plan before leaving Washington last week for a two-week recess.¶ Plus, senators swatted away questions on the actual unresolved issue — visas for low-skilled workers, which has pitted labor groups and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce against each other.¶ “The bottom line is we are very close. I’d say we are 90 percent there,” said Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.). “We have a few little problems to work on … but we’re very hopeful that we will meet our deadline.”¶ But moving beyond broad-brush strokes to an actual bill is a huge hurdle, particularly on immigration reform, which has failed at least twice before over contentious details

#### PC low

Darrell Delamaide 3/27 is Marketwatch Staff , “Obama gains no traction on fiscal, economic fronts,” March 27, 2013, <https://mail.google.com/mail/#inbox>, Accessed Date: 3-28-13 y2k

President Barack Obama’s second term is only two months old, but it may not be too early to write his political obituary as a mediocre president who meant well. The president stands by — or worse, goes off to play golf with Tiger Woods — while other people make the decisions that determine our economy and many other things in our lives. Congress continues to squabble over budgets and sequestration, with the White House seeming to have little effect on these deliberations. Obama will have to sign a temporary funding bill this week that preserves most of the spending cuts he objects to just to keep the government from shutting down. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and his colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee are keeping the economy afloat with an accommodative monetary policy and no help at all from the administration. Most of the initiatives that Obama announced boldly in his inaugural speech and State of the Union — gun control, immigration and tax reform, action on climate change — seem to be going nowhere fast. His biggest success so far seems to be his ability to play the brackets in March Madness. His recent trip to the Middle East produced little more than an opportunity for Obama to visit the historic Petra site in Jordan. The president who spent most of his first term relying on a lackluster cabinet and abdicating most of the important policy work to a divided Congress, seems intent in his second term on relying on an even more lackluster cabinet and an even more divided Congress. The two biggest accomplishments of Obama’s first term — the Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank financial reform — were largely designed by congressional committees and are proving themselves to be unwieldy and difficult to implement. In his new term, after declaring climate change to be a top priority, Obama appointed the chief executive of a sporting goods manufacturer and Mobil Oil veteran to the key post of Interior secretary. After reaffirming his support for alternative energies, he appointed an academic who champions fracking and nuclear energy as his Energy secretary. Faced with persistent concern about banks being too big to fail, especially in the wake of damaging revelations about the breakdown of risk controls at the country’s largest bank, the president keeps on an attorney general who admits to Congress it’s too difficult to bring big banks to justice because the financial system might collapse if he did. He appoints a Treasury secretary who held a lucrative position at Citigroup in between Democratic administrations and got a handsome payoff when he returned to public service. He nominated a new head of the Securities and Exchange Commission whose biggest claim to fame as a defense attorney is squelching an SEC investigation into possible insider trading by the former head of Morgan Stanley. So just two months into this president’s second term, there’s virtually no trace of the hope and change he promised when he swept to victory in his first presidential campaign in 2008. Instead, the electoral machine that successfully got him elected to the second term has now become more about campaigning than governing. It’s hard to discern exactly what Obama is campaigning for, however. He cannot run for a third term. If what he wants is public pressure to get his policies enacted, or ultimately a renewed Democratic majority in both houses of Congress in 2014, jetting to rallies around the country may not be the best way to get it. Instead, with increasing defections among key Democratic senators — South Dakota’s Tim Johnson is set to announce his retirement — it is looking harder than ever to preserve that party’s slim majority in the Senate, which is ineffective in any case given the lack of filibuster reform. In the meantime, we are stuck with what appears to be a federal government limping along from one fiscal Band-Aid to another. Policy is being made by a sequestration law that was designed to be so abhorrent it would never come into effect. Obama may be tenacious enough to get something done. But right now, after an initial flutter of hope from November’s electoral victory, it’s hard to imagine anything like real change from this administration.

#### Infrastructure spending triggers the link AND proves Obama can multitask

The Guardian, 3-29, 2013,

(Dominic Rushe, "Obama unveils plans to pump billions into US infrastructure in Miami speech", PAS) [www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/mar/29/obama-us-infrastructure-spending-miami-speech](http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/mar/29/obama-us-infrastructure-spending-miami-speech) 3-29-13

Barack Obama unveiled new plans to pump billions into US infrastructure on Friday as he moved to return the focus back to the economy and jobs.¶ Calling it his "partnership to rebuild America," Obama outlined proposals to revamp the nation's ailing highways, bridges and other public projects at Port Miami, which is undergoing a $2bn (£1.3bn) upgrade. The president, having shed his suit jacket, stood on a platform overlooking the tunnel project on Dodge Island to outline plans officials said would put the emphasis on private financing for public projects.¶ "In a time of tight budgets we have got to do it in a way that will ensure taxpayers' money is spent wisely," he said during a short speech which lasted only a few minutes.¶ He said investment of infrastructure had repaired 20,000 bridges, thousands of miles of roads and put tens of thousands of workers back in work. But he added that the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) gave US infrastructure a D+ in a report earlier this month and warned the country had serious problems with its bridges, dams, drinking water, energy, hazardous waste disposal, ports, rail, roads and schools among other areas.¶ Among his proposals were renewed calls for a $10bn "infrastructure bank." He also mentioned new plans for $4bn in loans and grants for infrastructure projects and tax breaks for foreign pension funds to encourage investment.¶ The president addressed America's "ageing infrastructure badly in need of repair" during his state of the union speech in February. The "fix it first" policy called for investing $50bn in transportation infrastructure, subject to Congressional approval.¶ Those proposals drew immediate fire from Republican rivals. House speaker John Boehner said: "It's easy to go out there and be Santa Claus and talk about all these things you want to give away, but at some point, somebody's got to pay the bill."¶ Obama's new emphasis on private funding appears to be driven in part by Republican opposition to increased government spending. It comes as he used the Easter recess to put pressure on lawmakers to take action on immigration reform and to enact gun-control measures.¶ A White House official said the president would press for infrastructure spending even as he continues his calls for other reforms. "As president you need to be able to do a lot of things at once," he said.

#### Obama pushing solar

AFP 3/15 “Obama defends green energy push after budget cuts,” March 15, 2013, <http://www.solardaily.com/reports/Obama_defends_green_energy_push_after_budget_cuts_999.html>, Accessed Date: 3-23-13 y2k

US President Barack Obama defended green energy research spending Friday, two weeks after budget cuts kicked in, warning that those reductions would leave America trailing its global rivals. In a speech that sought to develop his plan to spend $2 billion in the next decade on an energy security program, Obama said such an outlay was needed to ensure jobs and argued that the ongoing cuts could only harm the country. "And one of the reasons I was opposed to these cuts is because they don't distinguish between wasteful programs and vital investments," Obama said at the Argonne National Laboratory, a science and engineering research center. "They don't trim the fat; they cut into muscle and into bone, like research and development being done right here," he added, at the center located near Chicago. The budget sequester that began this month -- because the White House and Congress failed to agree a compromise on spending and taxes -- means "we're looking at two years where we don't start new research," Obama said. "Imagine what that means when China and Germany and Japan are all continuing to plump up their basic research and we're just sitting there doing nothing," he added. The latest impasse between the White House and Capitol Hill resulted in the imposition of a $85 billion austerity drive affecting all government departments, which started on March 1, threatening US growth. Obama last month called on Congress to do more to combat climate change and he plans to introduce further efficiency standards for cars and renew a push on the development of wind, solar and cleaner natural gas energy. His proposed reforms face a tough ride in Congress, however, as Republican lawmakers have heavily criticized government spending on green energy programs during Obama's first term, arguing that the outcomes did not justify the cost.

#### Plan is popular

Nuebring 11 Our Generation's Sputnik Moment: Comparing the United States' Green Technology Pilot Program to Green Patent Programs Abroad, Summer 2011, Kate Nuehring, Northwestern University, School of Law, Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, 9 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 609, Lexis

At the time the program was announced, the Green Technology Pilot Program was expected to be a very popular mechanism for applicants. Early on, the USPTO estimated that approximately 20,000 patent applications filed before December 9, 2009 would qualify for expedited examination. n14 However the program was limited to the first 3,000 applicants to apply. n15 After accepting 3,000 applications into the program, the USPTO said it would reevaluate the workload and resources needed to extend the pilot program. n16 Both politicians and industry leaders lauded the program as an incentive for the development of green technologies and industries in the United States. n17 One of the reasons the program was expected to be so successful was the amount of time by which it would reduce a patent's pendency. USPTO Director David Kappos, at a press conference announcing the new program, indicated that the Green Technol-ogy Pilot Program was estimated to cut pendency time by twelve months. n18 Another patent practitioner estimated that the program would cut pendency from forty months to twenty-four months. n19

#### Patents for renewable energy is bipartisan

Scott A. McKeown 10 is a member of the Oblon & Spivak’s Management Committee, and co-chair the Post Grant Patent practice group, “Patent Reform Still on the Table,” Nov 5, 2010, <http://www.oblon.com/patent-reform-still-table>, Accessed Date: 3-23-13 y2k

Bipartisan support and economic spin keep hope alive. With all of the change brought by last Tuesday’s elections, the mandate to Congress has been made quite clear. Namely, the American public is expecting less government spending, an improved economy, and lower taxes (amen). Due to the significant shake up, one is left wondering what if any impact these personnel changes will have on everyone’s favorite never ending legislative saga….that is, patent reform. One notable change is that now that the GOP controls the House, the chair of the Judiciary Committee will shift from Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.) to Rep. Lamar Smith (R-Texas). Earlier this week, Congressman Smith outlined his agenda. High on his agenda was, well, you guessed it……… Congressman Smith characterized the patent reform pending legislation as: Nearly 30 percent of American workers are found in intellectual property industries such as health care, entertainment, renewable energy and information-technology. Patents protect this intellectual property and encourage the creativity and innovation that generate jobs and increase productivity. The theft of intellectual property costs Americans billions of dollars and thousands of jobs. When inventors and businesses invest in research and development that result in patents, they have the right to benefit from their efforts. The American economy benefits too by the jobs these patents create. We need to improve our patent system to better protect intellectual property and help ensure that good patents are approved more quickly. There is bipartisan support for much-needed revisions to our patent system, which has not been significantly updated in over half a century. Patent reform appears to have bipartisan support, and can be sold to the public as a form of economic stimulus. It is very unlikely we will see it this year….but you can bet it will be sold to us, in some form, next year….but then again, we have been saying that for many years.

#### Solar popular despite Solyndra---Obama push now

Lisa Ann Pinkerton 13 is founder of Women In Cleantech & Sustainability, a group dedicated to the advancement of women in various environmental and technology sectors. She is also Founder and President of Technica Communications, where she handles marketing and public relations strategies for cleantech and biotech companies. Lisa Ann is a former award-winning broadcast journalist who reported for National Public Radio, PBS Television, WPXI-NBC, American Public Media, and Free Speech TV. “Solar Says "Good-bye Solyndra",” February 20, 2013, <http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/blog/post/2013/02/solar-says-good-bye-solyndra>, Accessed Date: 3-28-13 y2k

No company has done greater damage to the image of the American solar industry than Solyndra. It was therefore a source of great delight to me last week as I drove along Interstate 880 through Fremont, CA for what I didn't see. The signs on the old factory were gone. Those persistent thorns in the side of American solar, had finally vanished, closing a chapter in solar history. It was unfortunate enough that the ill-fated company received DoE loans and then declared bankruptcy. Once the Republican Party attempted to exploit that into what they saw as an Obama scandal, those signs looming over 880 were like knives twisting in the gut of solar. Let's face it, the center of influence and legacy expertise for the cleantech industry is in the San Francisco Bay Area. It’s home to 100‘s of cleantech companies, investors and blossoming technologies waiting to be commercialized. Many of us drive 880 on a regular basis and I can only imagine what a persistent cloud of doom those signs were. How many times did cleantech professionals pass by and feel fear or doubt about their own company ending up like Solyndra? How many times did the signs make a venture capitalist thinks twice about funding a promising cleantech start up? How many times did the signs prevent a homeowner from switching their house to solar? In my business running a boutique cleantech public relations and social media firm, perception is everything. One's perception is shaped by their prospective and everything in our world influences that prospective, for good or for bad. If you have something constantly reminding you of your past failures, casting doubts on your abilities and suggesting you have no hope of future success, it is very difficult to succeed. In relationships, we call this mental abuse. For me, the departure of the signs represents a delightful turning point for the industry. The cloud has been lifted. It's a symbol that the story of the company's fall is finally "old news" that no one is interested in any more. The fact that President Obama was so bullish on clean technology in his 2013 State of the Union is testament to this. The Republicans may have gained some short term political leverage by attacking an industry that's growing at 13% and creating over 13,000 new jobs in this country, but the Obama reelection shows they ultimately did not succeed with the tactic. As the industry continues to grow and challenge entrenched fossil fuel interests, we can expect more attempts the politicize solar, especially as more states reach grid parity. Ultimately, the solar industry will find it's mainstream legs and reach a tipping point to being the energy of choice. Until then, it's up to us as an industry to educate and shape public perception in the industry’s favor.

#### Plan generates a win

Steven Stanek 9 is Journalist @ The National UAE, “Obama stands to gain massive political capital,” Jun 3, 2009, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/americas/obama-stands-to-gain-massive-political-capital#ixzz2Lad93psI>, Accessed Date: 2-21-13 y2k

WASHINGTON // Last winter, the threat of a massive economic collapse in the United States seemed all too real. The country was at the edge of an economic abyss, legislators warned, often invoking the Great Depression. Credit markets shut down, the stock market plunged and panic was palpable across the country, from big-city coffee shops to small-town diners. "The situation we face could not be more serious," cautioned President Barack Obama in February, during one of his many sobering assessments of the country's fiscal health. "If we don't act immediately … our nation will sink into a crisis that, at some point, we may be unable to reverse." But six months later, at the onset of summer, much of that crisis atmosphere seems to have evaporated. Timothy Geithner, the treasury secretary, declared last month that the country has stepped back from the ledge and is now at the "beginning" of a recovery. "The national economy is showing some initial signs of stability," he said in a rare bout of optimism during a press conference near Boston. No one is ready to uncork the champagne just yet. Legislators and economists continue to point out that the economy is still contracting, only at a slower rate. But while at least some of the panic subsides, the result could be a huge gain in political capital for an already popular president. If Mr Obama is perceived by the American public as having steered the economy away from disaster - regardless of whether or not economists agree that his policies were ultimately the tool that fixed the problem - the goodwill could bolster his ability to take on other key issues such as healthcare and immigration reform while improving the Democratic Party's in upcoming elections. "If he pulls it off - and he's pulling it off right now - it's huge political capital for him and it will give him great latitude on a range of political issues," said Larry Berman, a political science professor at the University of California, Davis. "If Barack Obama's economic programme succeeds, it is inconceivable to think of the Republican Party becoming a majority chances for a really long time." Of course, the scenario works both ways. If the economy is slow to recover, that could harm Mr Obama's political fortunes. "This is the poker game he's playing," Mr Berman said. The president's recovery plan has included a stimulus plan of $787 billion (Dh2.9 trillion), which at one point he likened to a "blood infusion" to stabilise a dying patient. Mr Obama also has overseen an unprecedented intervention by the federal government into the private sector, giving Washington the authority to fire corporate executives whose companies received bailout money and set executive pay limits. So far, the "patient" is showing signs of improvement. The 700-point drops that panicked investors last autumn have given way to the ebb and flow of a more stable market. While the unemployment rate rose to 8.9 per cent in April - the highest level since 1983 - the pace of job loss slowed considerably over the previous month. Meanwhile, consumer confidence improved dramatically in April and new figures show that the gross domestic product shrank at a slower rate than was expected. US home sales figures for April, released yesterday, showed the biggest monthly jump in nearly eight years. "The consumer panic phase of the recession has largely ended," said Michael Englund, the chief economist at Action Economics in Boulder, Colorado. But Mr Englund and others caution that there are still more phases to go before anyone can claim victory. Ordinary citizens, he said, are unlikely to believe the recession is over as long as employment opportunities and investments by businesses continue to decline. "Even if the rate of collapse is diminishing, I think we are actually going to have to be two years or more into this before mom and pop say we fixed the economy," he said. They may not say it, but Republicans stand to gain the most from a slow economic recovery. They have described Mr Obama's policies with some of their sharpest rhetoric, calling his stimulus plan an example of "runaway spending" and decrying his "big government mentality". The Republican National Committee last month passed a resolution calling on Democrats to "stop pushing our country towards socialism and government control". For the time being, however, most Americans seem to disagree. Mr Obama's approval rating hovers at about 60 per cent, according to most polls. About two-thirds of the public also approve of Mr Obama's handling of the economy. sstanek@thenational.ae

#### US/Indian relations are resilient

Mancuso 8 (Mario, Undersecretary of Commerce, “The Future of the U.S.-India High Technology Relationship”, 6-2, http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2008/mancuso06052008.htm)

The strength of today’s U.S. and India relationship is real, and underscores what visionary governments can accomplish for their people by acknowledging change and seizing opportunities.   Shared interests and values, and improved economic and trade relations, have transformed the U.S.-India bilateral relationship into a "strategic partnership."  And while tender points remain, the DNA of our partnership is more differentiated, healthy, and resilient than ever before. Of the many dialogues that nurture our bilateral economic relationship, few have been as vibrant or had as much impact as the U.S.-India High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG).

#### Relations high now – diverse ties now

Economic Times, 3-28, 2013,

("State to State ties adding new dimension to India-US relations", PAS) articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-03-28/news/38099413\_1\_indian-ambassador-maryland-house-new-dimension 3-30-13

WASHINGTON: India's top diplomat in America has said that the development of ties between the states of the two countries is adding new dimension to the India-US relationship.¶ Addressing the Maryland House of Delegates, Indian Ambassador to the US Nirupama Rao referred to the efforts of different States from both India and the US to develop their own ties with the other country.¶ Last year, Governors of several American States had travelled to India, while this year Governors of as many as eight States are planning to visit India.¶ Similarly several Indian States are sending their top delegations to the US.¶ "Today, a new dimension is being added to this relationship. These are the ties between states in your country and states in ours," Rao said in her address.¶ "Maryland has been one of the pioneers in this regard and we admire and are completely supportive of the initiatives you have taken in this regard," she said.¶ The Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley's six-day visit to India in November 2011, she said, produced significant results with nearly USD 60 million in business deals for Maryland companies and sending, as the Governor said, "a strong message to India's top business organizations and companies that Maryland is the gateway to doing business in the US."

# 1AR Heg Bad

### Heg

#### Unipolarity is key to status bargaining—massive interdisciplinary research proves---multipolarity fails.

William Wolfworth 9 is Professor of government @ Dartmouth College “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009

Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. [6](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f6) Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more **dissatisfaction and** clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f7) “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”[8](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f8) While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for **status tend to be** zero sum.[9](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f9) I begin by describing the puzzles facing predominant theories that status competition might solve. Building on recent research on social identity and status seeking, I then show that under certain conditions the ways decision makers identify with the states they represent may prompt them to frame issues as positional disputes over status in a social hierarchy. I develop hypotheses that tailor this scholarship to the domain of great power politics, showing how the probability of status competition is likely to be linked to polarity. The rest of the article investigates whether there is sufficient evidence for these hypotheses to warrant further refinement and testing. I pursue this in three ways: by showing that the theory advanced here is **consistent** with what we know about large-scale patterns of **great power conflict** through **history**; by [End Page 30] demonstrating that the causal mechanisms it identifies did drive relatively secure major powers to military conflict in the past (and therefore that they might do so again if the world were bipolar or multipolar); and by showing that observable evidence concerning the major powers’ identity politics and grand strategies under unipolarity are consistent with the theory’s expectations. Puzzles of Power and War Recent research on the connection between the distribution of capabilities and war has concentrated on a hypothesis long central to systemic theories of power transition or hegemonic stability: that major war arises out of a power shift in favor of a rising state dissatisfied with a status quo defended by a declining satisfied state.[10](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f10) Though they have garnered substantial empirical support, these theories have yet to solve two intertwined empirical and theoretical puzzles—each of which might be explained by positional concerns for status. First, if the material costs and benefits of a given status quo are what matters, why would a state be dissatisfied with the very status quo that had abetted its rise? The rise of China today naturally prompts this question, but it is hardly a novel situation. Most of the best known and most consequential power transitions in history featured rising challengers that were prospering mightily under the status quo. In case after case, historians argue that these revisionist powers sought recognition and standing rather than specific alterations to the existing rules and practices that constituted the order of the day. In each paradigmatic case of hegemonic war, the claims of the rising power are hard to reduce to instrumental adjustment of the status quo. In R. Ned Lebow’s reading, for example, Thucydides’ account tells us that the rise of Athens posed unacceptable threats not to the security or welfare of Sparta but rather to its identity as leader of the Greek world, which was an important cause of the Spartan assembly’s vote for war.[11](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f11) The issues that inspired Louis XIV’s and Napoleon’s dissatisfaction with the status quo were many and varied, but most accounts accord [End Page 31] independent importance to the drive for a position of unparalleled primacy. In these and other hegemonic struggles among leading states in post-Westphalian Europe, the rising challenger’s dissatisfaction is often difficult to connect to the material costs and benefits of the status quo, and much contemporary evidence revolves around issues of recognition and status.[12](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f12) Wilhemine Germany is a fateful case in point. As Paul Kennedy has argued, underlying material trends as of 1914 were set to propel Germany’s continued rise indefinitely, so long as Europe remained at peace.[13](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f13) Yet Germany chafed under the very status quo that abetted this rise and its elite focused resentment on its chief trading partner—the great power that presented the least plausible threat to its security: Great Britain. At fantastic cost, it built a battleship fleet with no plausible strategic purpose other than to stake a claim on global power status.[14](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f14) Recent historical studies present strong evidence that, far from fearing attacks from Russia and France, German leaders sought to provoke them, knowing that this would lead to a long, expensive, and sanguinary war that Britain was certain to join.[15](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f15) And of all the motivations swirling round these momentous decisions, no serious historical account fails to register German leaders’ oft-expressed yearning for “a place in the sun.” The second puzzle is bargaining failure. Hegemonic theories tend to model war as a conflict over the status quo without specifying precisely what the status quo is and what flows of benefits it provides to states.[16](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f16) Scholars generally follow Robert Gilpin in positing that the underlying issue concerns a “desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work,” “the nature and governance of the system,” and “the distribution of territory among the states in the system.”[17](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f17) If these are the [End Page 32] issues at stake, then systemic theories of hegemonic war and power transition confront the puzzle brought to the fore in a seminal article by James Fearon: what prevents states from striking a bargain that avoids the costs of war? [18](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f18) Why can’t states renegotiate the international order as underlying capabilities distributions shift their relative bargaining power? Fearon proposed that one answer consistent with strict rational choice assumptions is that such bargains are infeasible when the issue at stake is indivisible and cannot readily be portioned out to each side. Most aspects of a given international order are readily divisible, however, and, as Fearon stressed, “both the intrinsic complexity and richness of most matters over which states negotiate and the availability of linkages and side-payments suggest that intermediate bargains typically will exist.”[19](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f19) Thus, most scholars have assumed that the indivisibility problem is trivial, focusing on two other rational choice explanations for bargaining failure: uncertainty and the commitment problem.[20](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f20) In the view of many scholars, it is these problems, rather than indivisibility, that likely explain leaders’ inability to avail themselves of such intermediate bargains. Yet recent research inspired by constructivism shows how issues that are physically divisible can become socially indivisible, depending on how they relate to the identities of decision makers.[21](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f21) Once issues surrounding the status quo are framed in positional terms as bearing on the disputants’ relative standing, then, to the extent that they value their standing itself, they may be unwilling to pursue intermediate bargaining solutions. Once linked to status, easily divisible issues that theoretically provide opportunities for linkages and side payments of various sorts may themselves be seen as indivisible and thus unavailable as avenues for possible intermediate bargains. The **historical record** surrounding **major wars** is **rich with evidence** suggesting that positional **concerns over status frustrate bargaining**: expensive, protracted conflict over what appear to be minor issues; a propensity on the part of decision makers to frame issues in terms of relative rank even when doing so makes bargaining harder; decision-makers’ [End Page 33] inability to accept feasible divisions of the matter in dispute even when failing to do so imposes high costs; demands on the part of states for observable evidence to confirm their estimate of an improved position in the hierarchy; the inability of private bargains to resolve issues; a frequently observed compulsion for the public attainment of concessions from a higher ranked state; and stubborn resistance on the part of states to which such demands are addressed even when acquiescence entails limited material cost. The literature on bargaining failure in the context of power shifts remains inconclusive, and it is premature to take any empirical pattern as necessarily probative. Indeed, Robert Powell has recently proposed that indivisibility is not a rationalistic explanation for war after all: fully rational leaders with perfect information should prefer to settle a dispute over an indivisible issue by resorting to a lottery rather than a war certain to destroy some of the goods in dispute. What might prevent such bargaining solutions is not indivisibility itself, he argues, but rather the parties’ inability to commit to abide by any agreement in the future if they expect their relative capabilities to continue to shift.[22](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f22) This is the credible commitment problem to which many theorists are now turning their attention. But how it relates to the information problem that until recently dominated the formal literature remains to be seen.[23](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f23) The larger point is that positional concerns for status may help account for the puzzle of bargaining failure. In the rational choice bargaining literature, war is puzzling because it destroys some of the benefits or flows of benefits in dispute between the bargainers, who would be better off dividing the spoils without war. Yet what happens to these models if what matters for states is less the flows of material benefits themselves than their implications for relative status? The salience of this question depends on the relative importance of positional concern for status among states. Do Great Powers Care about Status? Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.[24](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f24) By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research **in disciplines ranging from neuroscience** and **evolutionary biology** to **economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology** that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.[25](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f25) People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

#### Regional powers can’t solve the conflicts that would erupt in the absence of US power – active engagement is key.

Schmitt, Resident scholar and director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, 2006 [Gary, “Is there any alternative to U.S. primacy?” The Weekly Standard, Books & Arts, Vol. 11 No. 22, February 20, Lexis]

In the case of Europe, after examining both the sources of tension and cooperation in current transatlantic relations, Lieber argues that Europe has no choice but to depend on American leadership and power. Europe's lack of unanimity over foreign policies, and its own lack of hard power, leave it [Europe] with little choice but to rely on the United States when it comes to maintaining the world's security blanket. As for the Middle East, after making the case for going to war with Saddam's Iraq--a case that ultimately hinges on the risks of not acting – Lieber notes that it still remains the case that "only the U.S." can deter regional thugs, contain weapons proliferation to any degree, keep the Arab-Israeli peace process afloat, and keep the oil supplies flowing to us and our allies. And in Asia, it is the United States that "plays a unique stabilizing role . . . that no other country or organization can play." Absent America's presence, the region's key actors would face a dramatically different set of security concerns, in which more overt, "great power" competition would likely become the norm. Lieber is not oblivious to the fact that the rest of the world is hardly happy with this state of affairs, even while at times reluctantly admitting its necessity. As he quotes one European parliamentarian, "There are a lot of people who don't like the American policeman, but they are happy there is one." Nor, Lieber admits, is this situation made any easier by the sometimes ham-handed way in which Washington works with its friends and allies.

#### No extinction

Gladwell 99 (Malcolm, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, p. 31-32)

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the **limitations** of microscopic life forms.